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I. INTRODUCTION
The Spanish Constitution of 1978,' a milestone in Spain's transition
from the Franco era to the ranks of Western European democracies, has
been described, in at least one respect, as "absolutely innovative on the
panorama of European constitutions."2 It is "the first constitution worldwide
to raise consumer protection to the status of a principle of general law."I
Chapters Three and Four of the Spanish Constitution provide in relevant
part:
Art. 51.1: The public authorities shall guarantee the
protection [defensa] of consumers and users, protecting the
safety, health and legitimate economic interests of same by
means of effective procedures.
Art. 51.2: The public authorities shall promote the
informing and educating of consumers and users, foster
their organizations and attend to them on matters which
may relate to the foregoing, upon the terms established by
law.
Art. 51.3: Within the framework laid down in the
foregoing paragraphs, the law shall regulate domestic
1. The official text was published in the BOLETIN OFICIAL DEL ESTADO [Official Bulletin of
the State] [hereinafter B.O.E.] on December 29, 1978. See Spain, in 18 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds. & Gisbert H. Flanz trans.,
1991) (also reprinting the official Spanish-language text); and George E. Glos, The New Spanish
Constitution, 7 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 47 (1980). The translation contained in an appendix to
Professor Glos' article appears to be based on a different text from the Spanish text reprinted in the
Blaustein & Flanz collection.
2. lgnacio Diaz de Lezcano Sevillano, La Responsabilidad del Productor: Referencia a la
Directiva Comunitaria y a las Leyes y Proyectos de Actuaci6n, 43 ANUARIO DE DERECHO CIVIL
737, 742 (1990) (translation in the text by the Author, as are all other translations herein, except as
otherwise noted).
3. Paloma Pemdn Domecq, Products Liability in Spain, 15 COMP. L.Y.B. INT'L BUS. 137
(1993). Diaz de Lezcano Sevillano, while acknowledging that the Portuguese Constitution of two
years earlier had also contained a specific reference to consumers, indicates that the concrete
protections it afforded were rather more limited than those in the Spanish Constitution. Dfaz, supra
note 2 (quoting Portuguese Constitution of 1976). In its second revised form, promulgated in 1989,
the Portuguese Constitution now contains a new Article 60 with more extensive guarantees than
before. See Portugal, in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, supra note 1, at 7,
51, 170.
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commerce and the system [rdgimen] for authorizing
commercial products.
Art. 53.3: A recognition, respect and protection of the
principles recognized in [the above-cited provisions et al.]
shall inform positive law, the practice of the courts and the
actions of public authorities.'
Adopted against a backdrop of increased sensitivity in Western Europe to
matters of consumer protection generally and the issue of products liability in
particular,' it should be noted these provisions are neither merely hortatory,
nor self-executing. Rather, they affirmatively direct public authorities,
positive law, and the courts to see to their further implementation.
Both before and after the 1978 Constitution, the Spanish legal
system was naturally acquainted with the matter of liability from harmful
products. 6  Until the mid-1980's, matters of civil products liability were
addressed within the statutory framework provided by rather general
provisions of the Spanish Civil Code, and supplemented by judicial
improvisation., This regime, however, was significantly altered in 1984 with
the passage, in partial fulfillment of the constitutional mandate indicated
above, of a wide-ranging consumer protection act, the "General Law for the
Defense of Consumers and Users" (GAC). Chapter VIII of the GAC
contained a complex set of provisions dealing with liability for harm arising
from the consumption or use of goods, products and services. 9
4. CONSTITUCION arts. 51.1-3 & 53.3 (Spain) [hereinafter C.E.]. Article 51 was inspired or
influenced by the Resolution of the Council of the European Economic Community of April 14,
1975; a preliminary program for a consumer protection and information policy. Diaz, supra note 2,
at 742; Angel Rojo, La Responsabilidad Civil del Fabricante en el Derecho Espafol y en la
Directiva 85/374/CEE, in 3 LIBER AMICORUM: COLECCI6N DE ESTUDIOS JURiDICOS EN HOMENAJE
AL PROF. DR. D. JOSl PtREZ MONTERO 1253, 1256 (1988); compare C.E. art. 51.1-2 with, e.g.,
1975 O.. (C 92) 2 ("Consumer interests may be summed up by a statement of five basic rights: (a)
the right to protection of health and safety, (b) the right to protection of economic interests, (c) the
right of redress, (d) the right to information and education, [and] (e) the right of representation (the
right to be heard)").
5. See infra and text accompanying notes 90-97.
6. Rojo, supra note 4, at 1254.
7. For a discussion of the treatment of products liability matters arising before the effective
date of the 1984 legislation alluded to in the text that follows, see infra, text accompanying notes 20-
66.
8. For a discussion of the background of this law, see infra text accompanying notes 67 - 73.
The acronym GAC, which one encounters in some English language discussions, presumably stands
for the shorthand designation "General Act for Consumers."
9. For a discussion of the operation of the much-criticized, but still pathbreaking chapter VIII
of the GAC, see infra text accompanying notes 82-89.
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Less than a year after this new consumer protection law was
enacted, the Kingdom of Spain successfully concluded negotiations to join
the European Economic Community, signing a Treaty of Accession on June
12, 1985.10 The very next month the Council of the European Communities,
seeking to "approximate" Member States' laws on liability for defective
products, issued a long-awaited Products Liability Directive with instructions
that Member States implement its provisions in their domestic law." This
Directive clearly posed a problem for the not quite one year old GAC,
because "Spanish lawmakers, in writing the [1984] Act, had the Directive
project in mind but did not follow it."" Hence, Spanish lawmakers were
faced with a need to revisit the matter of products liability in order to fulfill
their obligations to the EEC, which included a requirement that the Directive
be implemented in Spanish national law by July 30, 1988.'
3
10. For Spain's accession, see Jason S. Abrams, European Economic Community: Entry of
Spain and Portugal-lnstruments Concerning the Accession of the Kingdom of Spain and the
Portuguese Republic to the European Communities, 27 HARV. INT'L L.J. 250 (1986). Under the
1992 Treaty on European Union, known as the Maastricht Agreement,
[t]he European Economic Community (EEC) was renamed the European Community
(EC), and a new entity was created, the European Union .... [TIhe European Union
(EU) . . . comprises three legal persons, the EC, the ECSC [European Coal and Steel
Community] and Euratom [European Atomic Energy Community] ..... [Iun law there
are still three Communities, though there is only one set of institutions ..... [T]he
European Union may be regarded as the legal and political concept which gives
expression to the underlying unity.
T.C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 8-9 (3d ed. 1994).
Hence, the practice followed herein is to refer to the "European Economic Community" as such
during the period for which that designation is technically accurate, and thereafter to refer either
to the "European Community" or "European Union."
11. Council Directive 85/374 of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of the laws, regulations
and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective products, 1985
O.J. (L 210) 29 [hereinafter Products Liability Directive]. Article 19 of the Directive provided that
"Member States shall bring into force, not later than three years from the notification of this
Directive, the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this
Directive." Id. at 33. For a discussion of the background and substantive terms of this EEC
legislation, see infra text accompanying notes 90-118.
12. Pem~n Domecq, supra note 3, at 155. The Preamble to the Act stated that its drafting had
taken account of relevant "principles and directives of the European Economic Community in
force." GAC, pmbl. para. 2. But see Miquel Martin Casals, Spain: Spanish Products Liability -
The Likely Impact of the New Act, LLOYDS PRODUCTS LIABILITY INT'L, Feb. 27, 1995, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters File ("I regret that the Spanish General Act approved in July 1984
didn't follow the already known proposals of the [EEC] P[roduct] L[iability] Directive."); cf. Ram6n
Mullerat & Sonia Cortes, Spain, in EUROPEAN PRODUCTS LIABILITY 339, 352 (Patrick Kelly &
Rebecca Attree eds., 1992) (noting distance between the GAC and the Directive).
13. Article 19 of the Directive provided Member States had three years from the Directive's
notification date to implement its provisions. For the relevant language of Article 19, see Directive,
supra note 11. Member States were notified on July 30, 1985. Id. at 33 n. 1.
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Like most other EEC Member States, Spain did not comply with the
Directive's mandate within the required time.,, Among the reasons cited for
this delay were policy disagreements within the Spanish Government'" and
general elections ,'16 the simple fact that Spain had previously opted to deal
with products liability by statute, which distinguishes it from most other
Member States whose national law questions of products liability were
effectively left to more easily superseded case law. 7  Finally, however, in
1994, the Spanish Parliament passed the "Law 22/1994 of July 6 on civil
liability for damages caused by defective products (SPLA),"' 8 noting in the
preamble that its object was "the adaptation of Spanish law to European
Community Directive 85/374/EEC of July 25, 1985 concerning civil liability
for damages caused by defective products."' 9
Part Two of this article describes the "original" state of Spanish
product's liability law under the most frequently invoked general provisions
of the Civil Code and the cases decided thereunder. Part Three will consider
the significant changes wrought to the Spanish legal regime by the passage of
the GAC in 1984. An understanding of both these states of the law is needed
for a complete understanding of current Spanish law, inasmuch as portions
of the legal status quo ante survive into the present. Part Four moves from
Spain to Europe, and sketches the background history and the key
substantive provisions of the 1985 EEC Products Liability Directive.
Returning to Spain, Part Five provides an analysis of the 1994 SPLA, the
legislation to implement the EC Directive. Part Six concludes with a number
of reflections and comparative observations.
14. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 119-126.
15. Mullerat & Cortes, supra note 12, at 361 (citing disagreement between Ministry of Justice
and Ministry of Health and Consumption); Abrams, supra note 10, at 277; see also infra text
accompanying notes 131-36.
16. Pemdn Domecq, supra note 3, at 159; see also infra text accompanying note 130.
17. Rojo, supra note 4, at 1254. Rojo notes the partial exception of the Federal Republic of
Germany's treatment of Pharmaceutical Products through a 1976 statute. Id.
18. Ley 22/1994, de 6 de Julio, Sobre Responsabilidad Civil por los Dahios Causados por
Productos Defectuosos, B.O.E., No. 15797, July 7, 1994. See infra Appendix (providing a
translation of the SPLA).
19. Id.
19961
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II. PRODUCTS LIABILITY UNDER THE SPANISH CIVIL CODE OF
18892
Commentators generally agree that the civil law of products liability
in Spain has historically not been an especially highly developed area of the
law.2' Case law has been sparse, 22 largely owing to the standard practice of
concurrent adjudication of both the criminal and civil liabilities to which the
defective products may have given rise.Y Other factors that have been
20. In principle, the label "products liability" can certainly be extended to include such
situations as claims for lost profits by one business against another, arising from some product
malfunction. Apart from the occasional sideward glance, however, this Article will focus chiefly on
what has come to be regarded as the core meaning of the term, as well as the sense in which it is
used in both the Directive and the SPLA: physical injuries to natural persons, along with any
concomitant material damage to their property and non-material damage (in the nature of emotional
distress or pain and suffering) to other protected interests of natural persons. Also, occasionally the
term used will be Product Liability. Nothing significant is meant by such alternation.
21. Casals, supra note 12 (identifying "main reason... why the law of torts in general, and
the law of product liability in particular, have not expanded sufficiently in Spain"); Mullerat &
Cones, supra note 12, at 339 (describing product liability law as "not properly developed"); GERD
BROGGEMANN, DIE PRODUKTHAFTUNG IM SPANISCHEN RECHT 59 (1988) (noting the "initially
rather hesitant" treatment of product liability in Spanish literature and decisions); cf Santiago
Cavanillas Migica, Prdctica de la Responsabilidad Civil en la Defensa de Conswidores y Usuarios,
45 REVISTA GENERAL DE DERECHO 4463 (1989) (describing Spanish Consumer Law generally as "a
novelty"); Rojo, supra note 4, at 1254 (describing product liability as "originally an imported topic"
from European and American law). But C. SANTIAGO CAVANILLAS MGICA, LA
TRANSFORMACI6N DE LA RESPONSABILIDAD CIVIL EN LA JURISPRUDENCIA 17 (1987) (opining that
a line of Spanish strict-liability decisions was "the equal of any of those existing in European
comparative law").
22. See Casals, supra note 12 (reporting that over the last 50 years the Spanish Supreme Court
averaged about one product liability decision a year, but with a "substantial increase in the late
80s"); see also Mullerat & Cortes, supra note 12, at 350 ("Decisions on product liability have been
very scarce.... in spite of the efforts of the courts, there has been no decisive case law for product
liability in Spain as in some other countries like the United States of America or the German Federal
Republic."); Rojo, supra note 4, at 1254 (calling Spanish Supreme Court decisions "scarce");
BROGGEMANN, supra note 21, at 61 (calling the number of Spanish product liability decisions "even
today still exceedingly small, particularly as regards the typical form they take, where no immediate
contractual relationship between manufacturer and end-purchaser exists"); id. at 62 (referring to
Spanish cases developing product liability as "quite paltry, right up to the present day").
23. Diaz de Lezeano Sevillano notes that under the combined effect of certain provisions of
the Civil and Criminal Codes,
civil obligations arising from delicts or faults are to be governed by the provisions of
the Criminal Code, which establishes that every person criminally liable is also civilly
liable. Consequently, criminal courts are obligated to decide on matters of civil
liability, unless the injured party expresses his wish either to waive such responsibility
or reserve it for subsequent exercise before the civil courts.
Diaz, supra note 2, at 751-52; see generally 2 JAIME SANTOS BRIZ, LA RESPONSABILIDAD
CIVIL: DERECHO SUSTANTIVO Y DERECHO PENAL 903-27 (6th ed. 1991) (discussing civil and
criminal product liability actions). Casals further describes this situation as follows:
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identified as contributing to the relatively low volume of products liability
actions on the civil side are: (1) Spain's long-standing "paternalistic"
welfare system, which effectively relegates tort law to the status of a "junior
partner" as a source of compensation for personal injuries; (2) the
impermissibility of contingent-fee arrangements as a means of compensating
plaintiffs' attorneys; (3) the inhospitality of Spanish law to class actions; (4)
the absence of presumptively proplaintiff juries in civil actions; (5) the lack
of a specialized products liability bar; and (6) the minimal attention given to
tort law, in general, and to products liability, in particular, in Spanish legal
education.4 Other commentators have noted: (1) the general caution of
Spanish courts, especially courts of first instance, in allowing claims for
which no unequivocal statutory basis exists;2 (2) difficulties of procedure and
proof; ' and (3) "still too little 'social sensitivity' in the Spanish legal order
[concerning the need] for manufacturers' products liability independent of
contractual relations. " 17 The argument that products liability is assigned a
lower value in predominantly agricultural Spain than in more highly
industrialized countries may once have been truer than it is today.2
In practice, where a criminal action is available, plaintiffs prefer to sue in the criminal
jurisdiction. The reason is this jurisdiction is regularly more expeditious and cheaper;
the public prosecutor has the duty to follow both actions in favor of the victim, and
take all the steps necessary to investigate all the relevant facts. Furthermore, his
activity is charged to the taxpayer and, in most cases, the victim doesn't even need to
pay for a private prosecutor. And finally, if the offender is found guilty, the victim
will not have to start a new process in order to, recover damages; if, on the contrary,
the offender is not found guilty, this decision does not preclude a civil action, and, the
victim can still claim for damages before the civil jurisdiction.
Casals, supra note 12; see also Mullerat & Cortes, supra note 12, at 350 (noting, inter alia, that
more evidence may be available to prove criminal liability than civil). On the generally restricted
discovery rights of civil litigants in Civil Law countries, see generally R. SCHLESINGER ET AL.,
COMPARATIVE LAW 426-28 (5th ed. 1988). Hence, because proven criminal liability for delict or
fault necessarily includes civil liability, there would be no need for a court's opinion to focus on the
particulars of civil liability as such. Conversely, should a court fail to find criminal liability (or
should the public prosecutor have declined to bring the criminal suit in the first place), that might
tend to indicate that the underlying facts on which the plaintiff would be relying in a civil action were
somewhat weak, thus diminishing the likelihood of plaintiff's prevailing therein. Against the
backdrop of two standard procedural rules which Spain shares with many if not most Civil Law
jurisdictions-the assessment of the prevailing party's attorney's fees against the losing party, and the
illegality of contingent fee arrangements as a means of paying one's own attorney's fees-the
perception of a diminished chance of success would operate as a significant disincentive to the
bringing of many cases that might otherwise have provided an opportunity for the elaboration of a
purely "civil" product liability case law.
24. Casals, supra note 12 (quoting John Fleming).
25. BROGGEMANN, supra note 21, at 62 (citing Angel Rojo y Fernndez Rio).
26. Id. (citing several Spanish commentators).
27. Id. at 62-63 (quoting Rojo y FemAndez Rio and citing Arrillaga).
28. Id. at 63 (citing Arrillaga).
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For such civil actions as did arise, the Spanish Civil Code of 1889
supplied a number of somewhat broadly worded principles of contract and
tort 9 liability which were generally considered to govern their disposition. 0
To the extent certain aspects of this earlier Spanish Products Liability law
continue to survive, even now that the SPLA has gone into effect, it is still
worthwhile to consider the operation of these sections of the Civil Code.
The relevant contract principles will be discussed first.
A. Contract-based Products Liability
Because Spanish civil law embraces the principle of privity of
contract," the contractual avenue of recovery for harms deriving from
products is only available when a contract relationship exists between a
products liability plaintiff" and the defendant. What this has meant in
practice is that contractual liability is generally asserted when a sales contract
had previously been entered into between the injured party as purchaser and
the manufacturer as seller of a defective product." However,
nonmanufacturing retailers are also potential defendants under a contract
theory.
There are two distinct forms in which a contract theory may be
advanced: one cause of action arises under the general law of obligations,
the other under the law of sales. Article 1101 of the Spanish Civil Code,
located in Book Four, Title One entitled "On Obligations," provides "those
who, in the performance of their obligations, commit fraud, negligence or
delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor of the aforesaid
29. What an Anglo-American lawyer would call tort liability would probably be referred to by
a Spanish lawyer as "extracontractual" or possibly "Aquilian" liability. See, e.g., Gabriel Garcia
Cantero, Exegesis Comparativa del Articulo 1.902 del C6digo Civil, in 1 CENTENARIO DEL
CODIGO CIVIL 875 (1990). The term "Aquilian" derives from the Lex Aquilia, a Roman law "of
fundamental importance in the law of delict," probably dating back to the late third century B.C. See
generally BARRY NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAw 16, 218-22 (1962). In the text,
however, I shall employ the term tort, more familiar to Anglo-American readers.
30. This situation was not substantially different from those prevailing in other European
countries. Prior to the mid-1980's, several European states did not have any product liability
legislation. This included the United Kingdom and Ireland whose common law jurisdictions did
not include any concept for product liability. If a person was injured in the United Kingdom
because of a defect in a product, they had to bring the claim either under the law of contract or
the law of negligence. Dai Davis, Product Liability in the European Community: A Practical
and Economic Perspective, 15 CoMP. L.Y.B. INT'L Bus. 117 (1993).
31. "Contracts only produce an effect as between the parties who make them ... " C6digo
Civil art. 1257 (Spain) [hereinafter C. CIV.]. This principle is usually referred to in Spanish law as
the "relativity" of contracts (relatividad de los contratos).
32. The class of potential plaintiffs under a contract theory includes, but is not limited to,
consumers.
33. Didz, supra note 2, at 754.
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[obligations], are subject to making indemnity for the damages and harms
caused."I, In meeting the required proof of the defendant-seller's
negligence, which would typically be at issue, the Article 1101 products
liability plaintiff may benefit from a somewhat relaxed burden of proof."
By contrast, article 1484, located in Book Four, Title Four, entitled
"On Contracts of Purchase and Sale," provides:
The seller shall be obligated to make indemnity for any
hidden defects the item sold may have had, if they make it
improper for its intended use or so diminish its use that the
buyer, had he known them, would not have acquired it or
would have paid less for it; but shall not be liable for
manifest defects or those which were visible, nor for those
which are not [manifest or visible] if the buyer is an expert
who, by reason of office or profession, ought easily to
have recognized them.36
Hence, under Spanish Sales law, sellers of goods are responsible for latent
product defects, both known and unknown," with no requirement to show
any kind of fault. However, because of a variety of disadvantages"8
34. C. Civ. art. 1101.
35. BROGGEMANN, supra note 21, at 134.
36. C.CIV. art. 1484.
37. Sellers' liability for unknown latent defects is, however, subject to agreement otherwise.
The seller is liable to the buyer for indemnifying hidden vices or defects in the thing
sold, even though he is unaware of them. This provision shall not apply when there
has been an agreement to the contrary, and the seller was unaware of the hidden vices
or defects of what has been sold.
C. CIv. art. 1485. The GAC may have made article 1485's disclaimer possibility ineffective as
applied to consumer contracts, because GAC art. 3.1 provides: "Products, activities and services
placed on the market so as to be available to consumers or users shall not involve risks to their health
or safety [except for those permitted by custom or regulation]." Mullerat & Cortes, supra note 12,
at 343.
38. The lack of a need to prove fraud might, at first, seem to make the sales cause of action
more attractive however relaxed the burden of proof under the "Obligations" theory. Furthermore,
article 1485's explicit imposition of liability for "unknown" defects would seem, prima facie, better
suited to address questions of liability for harms resulting from so-called "development risks," i.e.,
from product defects which the state of science and technology at the time the product was placed in
circulation did not permit to be realized. See infra text accompanying note 42 (discussing
development risks). Any seeming advantages, however, are more than offset by other aspects of
sales theory. Under sales law, the general remedy available to a plaintiff-buyer of a product with a
latent defect is merely a choice between rescission (with refund and expenses) and price reduction.
C.CIV. art. 1486. It is only if the seller has failed to inform the buyer of those latent defects which
are actually or constructively known to him that the seller becomes liable for damages, including
those for personal injury. Id. arts. 1486-88; Mullerat & Cortes, supra note 12, at 343-44; Dfaz,
supra note 2, at 754-55. This formulation would mean that his responsibility for injuries from
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associated with the Sales approach, products liability actions sounding in
contract were generally more likely to have been brought under the general
"obligations" theory.
The damages to which a successful products liability plaintiff under
an obligations theory is entitled are defined as "not merely the value of the
loss suffered, but also that of the gain which the [plaintiff] has failed to
obtain. . ... -9 However, this generous measure of damages is subject to a
very important caveat: to be compensable, the injuries sustained have to
have been foreseeable at the time the obligation arose.40 Only in cases of the
obligor's fraud does the obligee become entitled to "all [damages] which are
known to derive from breach of the obligation. "" Hence, this requirement
of foreseeability would exclude liability for injuries resulting from so-called
"development risks," i.e., defects that, because of the state of science or
technology existing at the time of the contract, were necessarily unknown to
the seller.42
As perhaps might be expected, because the law of obligations
imposes liability only for injuries which were the "necessary consequence"
of breach or "derive from" the breach,' 3 a defendant under a contract theory
development risks, unknowable ex hypothesi, would still remain minimal. The major disadvantage
of the sales theory, however, lies in its exceptionally short statute of limitations: six months from
delivery of the thing sold. C.CIV. art. 1490. Fortunately for plaintiffs, however, case law of the
Tribunal Supremo has long permitted plaintiffs to elect the Obligations theory where both were
applicable. BRUGGEMANN, supra note 21, at 120-23 (discussing a 1911 case); Dfaz, supra note 2, at
755. Furthermore, there is apparently no pro-plaintiff adjustment of the burden of proof in sales
law. See BRUGGEMANN, supra note 21, at 133-34. Additionally, the measure of damages is
generally agreed to be a "reliance" measure, rather than obligation law's "expectancy" measure, a
factor certainly of significance to prospective business plaintiffs. Id. at 111-12, 129-30.
39. C.CIv. art. 1486. BROGGEMANN notes that this includes all quantifiable injuries as well
as damages for accompanying non-material harms, such as loss of consortium. Only purely non-
material injuries would appear to be excluded. BRUGGEMANN, supra note 21, at 129; see also
Mullerat & Cortes, supra note 12, at 344 ("Damages for personal injury are generally calculated on
the basis of a particular amount per day the victim has not been able to work, in addition to any [pain
and suffering] and physical damage or costs incurred (e.g., medical expenses, etc.)").
40. "Apart from cases expressly mentioned by law, and those where the obligation so states,
no one shall be liable for those occurrences which could not have been foreseen or which, being
foreseen, were inevitable." C.CIV. art. 1105. "The damages and injuries for which the good-faith
obligor is liable are those foreseen or which could have been foreseen at the time the obligation arose
and which are a necessary consequence of its breach." Id. art. 1107, para. 1.
41. C.Civ. art. 1107, para. 2.
42. See BRUGGEMANN, supra note 21, at 91. For definitions of "development risks," see,
e.g., SPLA art. 6.1(e), infra, Diaz; Sevillano, supra note 2, at 763; Anita Bernstein, L'Harmonie
Dissonante: Strict Products Liability Attempted in the European Community, 31 VA. J. INT'L L.
673, 674 (1991). Bernstein notes that in American law, the concept of development risks will
typically surface in the context of the "state of the art defense." Id.
43. C.CM. art. 1107
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may defeat the claimed liability by showing the presence of such factors as
victim negligence approaching or equaling 100%," negligent intervention by
a third party which breaks the causal chain between the defective product
and injury, or force majeure or act of God." Spanish case law has also
accepted principles of comparative negligence in reducing the size of
awards.47
Compared to the tort theory discussed below, the contract theory of
products liability suffers from the perspective of injured consumers. For
example, some obvious drawbacks are: availability to only a limited class of
plaintiffs, i.e., those in privity of contract with the defendant; and availability
only against one class of defendants, members of which will not always have
the deepest pockets, i.e., nonmanufacturing retailers. 4 On the other hand,
the contract theory has the obvious advantage of a considerably longer
statute of limitations than tort theory; fifteen years for the former" versus
one year for the latter.-l Because of this advantage, legal writers have
attempted to develop lines of arguments under which the contract theory may
be employed against remote sellers like the manufacturer."
B. Products Liability in Tort
For all products liability plaintiffs not in privity of contract with their
defendants, the only generally accepted theory under which they might
recover was, until 1984, tort theory. Article 1902, modeled after key
provisions of the French Civil Code, 2 provides, "He who, by action or
omission, causes harm to another, with fault or negligence intervening, is
obligated to redress the damage caused." The tort liability, thereby, created
44. Cavanillas Mtigica, supra note 21, at 4476.
45. Mullerat & Cortes, supra note 12, at 345.
46. C.Civ. art. 1105.
47. Cavanillas Mdgica, supra note 21, at 4476.
48. As will be seen, it shares the exclusion of liability for development risks with tort theory.
See infra text accompanying note 61.
49. C.Civ. art. 1964 (providing a 15-year limitations period for general personal actions not
otherwise specified).
50. C.Civ. art. 1968. The one-year period, however, is extended to 15 years when the
defendant's actions also constitute a crime. Mullerat & Cortes, supra note 12, at 348.
51. See, e.g., Cavanillas Mtigica, supra note 21, at 4479; Sevillano, supra note 2, at 757.
52. "The formula used by the legislator in Article 1902 substantially reproduces the scheme
[contained in] Articles 1382 and 1383 of the French Civil Code . . . ." Dfaz, supra note 2, at 756;
cf BROGGEMANN, supra note 21, at 66 (noting overall influence of Napoleonic Code on the Spanish
Civil Code). For a discussion of the referenced articles of the Civil Code and the expansive reading
French courts have made of them and other sections, see generally SCHLESINGER et al., supra note
23, at 555-62; GERAINT HOWELLS, COMPARATIVE PRODUCT LIABILITY 101-10 (1993).
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was not disclaimable.5 3 Article 1902, "among the most frequently cited in
court decisions,"" was described by one Scholar as "the channel through
which it is possible to provide a basis for redressing damages occasioned by
defective products."5"
Like its French models, Article 1902 imports into the noncontractual
liability, analysis a requirement of fault. "For this liability to arise, what had
to come together were fault in the conduct of the manufacturer and a victim
who could prove it. '56 However, despite the formidable task that proof of
fault would appear to be, Spanish courts had in fact developed a practice of
inverting the burden of proof, with the result that it really was up to the
defendant to prove "that he had used all required diligence, according to the
circumstances" 1 or, in other words, his lack of fault. Hence, the
presumption was subject to rebuttal.-" The plaintiff, in any event, continued
to be responsible for demonstrating the causal relationship between the
defendant's fault and his injury, for which no presumptions were available.19
While the code does not provide a measure of damages for infractions of
Article 1902, the common opinion of courts and scholars is that Article 1902
"includes damages for both physical and nonmaterial injury."6°  These
damages are also subject to foreseeability requirements, 6 the same as
53. BROGGEMANN, supra note 21, at 175.
54. Garcfa Cantero, supra note 29, at 875.
55. Diaz, supra note 2, at 756; cf. Casals, supra note 12. If we analyze the main
decisions of the 1990's, it can be ascertained without much difficulty that the general clause of
Article 1902 CC and some of the devices created by jurisprudence, such as the reversal of the
burden of proof, would in most cases be sufficient to protect the victims of defective products.
Id.
56. Diaz, supra note 2, at 756.
57. SANTOS BRIZ, supra note 23, at 948; Mullerat & Cortes, supra note 12, at 348;
BROGGEMANN, supra note 21, at 164-73; see also Casals, supra note 55.
58. Mullerat & Cortes, supra note 12, at 348.
59. SANTOS BRIZ, supra note 23, at 948.
60. BROGGEMANN, supra note 21, at 160. Damages in tort cover all damages directly
caused by the negligent act and those that may be deemed to have been caused by the act, but not
those that are too remote. In particular, they include replacement of the product, damage
effectively caused and an amount for compensation for damage to property and other prejudices
[sic] and non-physical damage (pretium doloris) including pain and suffering, reputation, etc.
They cover not only the damage (damnum emergens) but also lost profits (lucrum cessans) if
there is sufficient evidence of the loss. In general, Spanish case law provides for a lump sum to
be paid for all the heads of damage. Mullerat & Cortes, supra note 12, at 347-48.
61. See supra text accompanying notes 40-42: Mullerat & Cortes, supra note 12, at 347.
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required for the defenses and mitigations described above for contractual
liability.6 2
Despite the courts' alleviation of the products liability plaintiffs task
by inverting the burden of proof,63 a number of commentators continued to
feel that "great difficulties," including proof difficulties and other procedural
and substantive complexities, continued to face product victims who sought
compensation from the manufacturer. One feature to be highlighted here is,
again, the rather short statute of limitations; one year from the date the
victim discovered or ought to have discovered the injury." One scholar
argued that one of the main impediments to a purely case law resolution of
the products liability question, and the reason so many plaintiffs' claims still
ran aground, was "the persistent primacy of the fault principle."6  Hence,
such opinions concluded, "[the] system of protection for consumers deriving
from these general rules was certainly insufficient. "6
III. GENERAL LAW FOR THE DEFENSE OF CONSUMERS AND USERS
The 1978 Spanish Constitution's explicit invocation of consumer
rights,6 along with Western Europe's growing engagement with the topic,6"
no doubt only served to bolster the widely shared sentiment among many
lawyers that Spanish law's treatment of products liability was somewhat
lacking. However, the true impetus for legal change may have been two
widely reported mass torts that galvanized public opinion thereby forcing
Spain's political leadership to respond. These tort incidents were the Los
Alfaques campsite disaster in 1978 and the so-called "Toxic Oil Syndrome"
of 1981 .61 The latter, most especially, revealed "the inadequacy of the law
62. See supra text accompanying notes 43-47; cf. Pem~in Domecq, supra note 3, at 139
(describing third-party negligence, acts of God (force majeure) and comparative negligence as
standard features of a civil liability system).
63. This judicial strategem of inversion of the burden of proof has been described as one
whereby "one slowly passes from a fault-based or subjective system to an objective system which
dispenses with fault." Dfaz, supra note 2, at 757.
64. C.CIv. art. 1968. But see Mullerat & Cortes, supra note 12, at 348.
65. Rojo, supra note 4, at 1254.
66. Dfaz, supra note 2, at 758 (listing anti-plaintiff factors identified by Bercovitz-Cafio).
"A further motive for the passage of the GAC was surely the fact that the form taken by the
dispositive [Civil Code] provisions on which a Products Liability claim could be grounded were
still viewed as inadequate for the successful bringing of an effective claim for damages from
defective products." BRUGGEMANN, supra note 21, at 77 (omitting citations to Civil Code).
67. See supra text accompanying notes 1-4.
68. See infra text accompanying notes 90-99.
69. On July 11, 1978, an over-capacity tanker truck carrying more than 23,000 kilos of liquid
propylene gas crashed into a campsite wall at Los Alfaques, near San Carlos de la Rapita along the
Mediterranean and exploded, killing 215 campers, mostly French, German, Belgian, Dutch and
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in force [and] moved the political parties ... to prepare or, best of all, to put
the finishing touches on, a piece of general legislation. In the electoral
programs and campaigns of the period, consumer protection achieved the
rank of a priority problem. "70
In September 1981, the center-right government of Prime Minister
Adolfo Sudrez sent the Cortes (the Spanish Parliament) a draft "Consumer
Law," the effect of which was either to make no change at all in the legal
status quo or, effectively contract the scope of protection afforded consumers
by confining products liability to a contractual basis. 71 The Spanish Socialist
English in nationality. See Bjorn Edlund, Untitled Report, UPI (International Section), Jan. 18,
1982, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI file; Kevin Dunn, Untitled Report, REUTERS, July
11, 1979, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters File; Fay Wiley & Miguel Acoca, A Scene
Out of Dante, NEWSWEEK, July 24, 1978, at 53.
Beginning in May of 1981, at least 402 people, chiefly from working class neighborhoods of
Madrid, died and many more became seriously ill, generally believed to be a result of ingesting
reprocessed industrial rapeseed oil marketed for cooking and consumption. The longest trial in
Spanish history concluded in 1989 with a conviction of the businessmen who had imported the oil
from France, tampered with it and sold it for home use. However, only two of the 37 defendants
ever went to prison as a result, a verdict which outraged the public. Adela Gooch, Court 12 Opens
Hearings on Oil Scandal, INDEPENDENT, Feb. 25, 1992, at 9; Robert Hart, Hundreds Shut Out of
Spanish Toxic Oil Hearings, REUTER LIBRARY REP., Feb. 24, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Reuters File; Richard Lorant, Mass Poisoning in Spain Still Steeped in Mystery, L.A.
TIMES, June 16, 1991, at A6.
Among the authorities who see a clear link between one or both of these events and the
heightened concern with product liability matters that led, inter alia, to the passage of the GAC are
PernAn Domecq, supra note 3, at 137; Mullerat & Cortes, supra note 12, at 369; Diaz, supra note 2,
at 759; Rojo, supra note 4, at 1256; Francisco Javier Tirado Srurez, La Directiva Comunitaria de
Responsabilidad Civil, Productos y Ordenamiento Espaofl, 43 REv. GENERAL DEL DERECHO 4967,
4973 (1987).
70. Rojo, supra note 4, at 1256. Among the first reactions were the passage of a regional
consumer protection act by the Basque Parliament in November of 1981. Portions of this Act were
held to be unconstitutional by the Spanish Constitutional Court the following year as going beyond
the legislative competence of the Spanish Constitution delegates to the so-called "Autonomous
Regions." Id. at 1256-58. A discussion of the Basque Consumer Statute, BOLETIN OFICIAL DEL
PAlS VASCO, Mar. 2, 1983, No. 26, and of consumer legislation by the Andalusian governments, is
beyond the scope of this Article. Ley 5/1985, de 8 de Julio, de Estatuto de los Consumidores y
Usuarios en Andalucia [Law 5/1985 of July 8, on the Statute of Consumers and Users in Andalusia]
B.O.E., July 20, 1985, No. 173; BOLETIN OFICIAL DEL PAlS VASCO BOLETIN OFICIAL DEL PAIS
VASCO, July 16, 1985, No. 71, Catalan (Ley 1/1990 de 8 de Enero, Sobre Disciplina del Mercado y
Defensa de los Consumidores y Usuarios [Law 1/1990 of Jan. 8, on market controls and defense of
consumers and users], B.O.E., Feb. 16, 1990, No. 41; Diario Oficial De La Generalidad De
Catalufia, Jan. 17, 1990, No. 1243); Galician (Ley 12/1984 de 28 de Diciembre, del Estatuto
Gallego del Consumidor y Usuario [Law 12/1984 of Dec. 28, on the Galician Consumer and User
Statute], B.O.E., June 11, 1985, No. 139; Diario Oficial De Galicia, Feb. 1, 1985, No. 23); and
Valencian (Ley 2/1987, de 9 de Abril, de Estatuto de Consumidores y Usuarios de la Comunidad
Valenciana [Law 2/1987, of Apr. 9, on the Valencian Community's Statute of Consumers and
Users], B.O.E., Apr. 29, 1987, No. 102; Diario Oficial De La Generalidad Valenciana, Apr. 15,
1987, No. 568.
71. Rojo, supra note 4, at 1258-59.
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Workers' Party, the P.S.O.E., then the largest group in the parliamentary
opposition, forwarded a response in its own draft, "Law for the Defense of
Consumers and Users." From the consumer's perspective and in the opinion
of at least one scholar, the P.S.O.E.'s draft was a distinct improvement over
not just the Suirez government's bill which preceded it, but even over the
later text of what would subsequently become the "General Law for the
Defense of Consumers and Users. "7
The GAC was passed in 1984 after the dissolution of the Cortes and
the accession of the P.S.O.E. to power under Prime Minister Felipe
GonzAlez.71 The widely shared opinion of legal scholars is as a piece of legal
craftsmanship, it was not just bad, but awful.7 Whatever its technical
defects, however, there is no doubt the GAC made significant changes in
Spanish products liability law."
Articles 1 and 2 of the GAC, stating that its provisions were in
furtherance of the Constitution's consumer protection provisions," began
with a broad enumeration of the basic rights of consumers and users, and a
72. Rojo opines that this may have had something to do with the fact that the Ministry of
Health and Consumption went to politicians other than those who had been most directly responsible
for the area of consumer protection. Rojo, supra note 4, at 1259-61.
73. Ley 20/1984, de 19 de Julio, General Para la Defensa de los Consumidores y Usuarios
[General Law for the Defense of Consumers and Users], B.O.E. 176, July 24, 1984. For translated
excerpts and a brief discussion in English see Ian S. Blackshow, New Spanish Law on Conswner
Protection, 5 Bus. L. REV. 290"(1984).
74 "The 1984 Act is a defective product itself; it is not only technically defective, but also
incoherent." Casals, supra note 12. "Incomplete and technically deficient ... reveals important
shortcomings . . . incoherent and technically defective." Mullerat & Cortes, supra note 12, at
339, 352. "The unintelligibility of its articles 25 to 28 is so radical that, in my opinion, it cannot
be overcome, not even by an interpretive effort well-meaningly bent on favoring consumers."
Cavanillas Mtigica, supra note 21, at 4464. A source of the highest legal uncertainty
[t]he result could not be worse. On the question of the manufacturer's civil liability
the Law, without intending to, constitutes a front attack on legal certainty . . . . The
system's lack of clarity and the imprecision of the terms employed has given rise to
very different and contradictory interpretations of the rules in force, with grave injury
to the public interest."
Rojo, supra note 4, at 1260. "[Article 28's strict liability r6gime] could not be called progressive
but purely and simply irrational." Id. at 1272. "At many points [including the product liability
regulations], the Act creates the impression that the wide sweep of the matters regulated was
often at the expense of a precise working through of the details." BROGGEMANN, supra note 21,
at 77; id. at 78 (noting "vehement" criticism in the literature).
75. See, e.g., Mullerat & Cortes, supra note 12, at 352; BROGGEMANN, supra note 21, at 85
(identifying GAC Article 28 as the law's "genuine innovation").
76. For the relevant constitutional text, see supra text accompanying note 4; see also
BRUGGEMANN. supra note 21, at 75 (describing GAC as rooted in Article 51.1-2 of the Spanish
Constitution).
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definition of the protected class under the act." The portions of the GAC
directly related to products liability appeared in chapter 8, Articles 25-31.
Article 25 sets out the general principle that consumers had a right to
compensation for harms caused to them by goods or services, except insofar
as the harm was their culpa exclusiva [own fault] or was caused by persons
for whom they were civilly liable. The principle is noncontroversial, and the
exception merely codified existing case law. But then chapter 8 of the GAC
confusingly went on to establish not one, but two separate regimes of
products liability. Articles 26 and 27 establish the "general" regime of
products liability, and Article 28 a "special" regime.
Much like Article 25, the "general" regime set up by Articles 267'
and 27,19 in essence, also largely codifies existing law, adding a few specific
rules for particular fact situations. While it is certainly possible to criticize
them, as scholars have done, for faulty draftsmanship, the regime these
77. GAC Articles 1.1 & 2. Consumers and users are defined in Article 1.2. For a
translation, see infra text accompanying note 87. The difference between them is apparently that the
term "consumers" relates to goods, and "users" to services. Diaz de Lezcano Sevillano, supra note
2, at 773. This article, however, will hereafter generally follow standard American usage in
referring simply to consumers, rather than to consumers and users.
78. GAC art. 26 provides:
Actions or omissions of those who produce, import, supply or provide products or
services to consumers or users which cause damage or harm to same shall give rise to
liability in the former, unless it appears or can be shown that there has .been
compliance with the demands and requirements established by regulation and with
other [types of] care and diligence demanded by the nature of the product, service or
activity.
Id.
79. GAC art. 27 provides:
a) the manufacturer, importer, seller or supplier of products or services to
consumers or users, shall be liable for the origin, quality and suitability of same, as per
their nature and purpose and the governing norms.
b) for products in bulk, the holder of same shall be liable, without prejudice to his
ability to identify and prove the liability of the prior holder or provider. 1. In general,
and without prejudice to more favorable results to consumers or users by virtue of
other provisions or conventional agreements, the following criteria shall govern on the
matter of liability
c) for products packed, labeled and enclosed with an unbroken seal, the company
or company name appearing on the label, presentation or advertising shall be liable. It
may be released from such liability by proving its falsification or incorrect
manipulation by third parties, who shall be those responsible.
d) If several persons shall have come together in producing the harm, they shall
be jointly and severally liable to the victims. Whoever pays the victim shall have a
right to seek contribution from the other liable parties, as per their participation in the
causation of the harm.
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articles set up was essentially the "rebuttable presumption of fault" regime
which Spanish courts had already created under Article 1902 of the Civil
Code . 0 Hence, it suffered from the same major defect as the latter:
rebuttable presumptions can be rebutted.8'
Article 28, the "special" liability regime, was quite a different
matter altogether:
28.1: Notwithstanding the foregoing, there shall be
liability for damages originating in the correct use and
consumption of goods and services when, by their very
nature or by being so established by regulation, they
necessarily include a guarantee of determinate levels of
purity, efficacy or safety, under objective conditions of
determination, and presuppose technical, professional or
systematic quality controls until they reach the consumer
or user in the proper condition.
28.2: In any event, considered to be subject to this
liability regime are all food products, those of hygiene and
cleanliness, cosmetics, pharmaceutical specialties and
products, sanitary services, gas and electric service,
household appliances and elevators, means of
transportation and motor vehicles, and toys and products
directed at children.
28.3: Without prejudice to what other statutory provisions
may establish, the liabilities arising under this Article will
have a limit of 500 million pesetas. This amount is to be
periodically revised and updated by the Government,
taking account of the variation in consumer price indices.2
What Article 28, in fact, established was a seemingly parallel products
liability regime qualitatively different from any preceding it. This regime
was one of strict liability, since it did not provide that a defendant's fault was
at all relevant to the plaintiff's case for recovery, either by way of proof or
presumption.
The obvious scope questions, then, would seem to be presented:
when does the "general," more traditional products liability regime of
80. BROGGEMANN, supra note 21, at 79-80. For criticism of the draftsmanship, see, e.g.,
Pemdn Domecq, supra note 3, at 141-42; Rojo, supra note 4, at 1265-67; see generally supra note
74, (citing authorities).
81. See supra text accompanying notes 57-59.
82. GAC art. 28.1-3.
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Articles 26 and 27 apply, and when does the "special," strict liability regime
of Article 28 apply? The technical conclusion of most commentators who
studied the matter was, in fact, that the exceptional regime of Article 28
basically swallowed up the general regime of Articles 26 and 27, because "it
is difficult to find a product that, either by inclusion in the list or by being
included within the definition, is subject to the general regime and not the
special. ' ,  Furthermore, the benefits of a strict liability theory were
enhanced by the very limited number of defenses a liable party could assert.
Liable parties can only free themselves of the obligation to
make indemnity if they prove the victim's fault (or the
fault of persons for whom the victim is civilly liable).
Only if the use or consumption has been 'incorrect' (art.
28.1 in connection with art. 25) is exoneration in order. 1
These liable parties apparently included almost everyone in the production
and distribution chain: the manufacturer, importer, seller, or supplier of the
products to consumers, any one of whom could be sued at the consumer's
election.1 Finally, as to damages available, there is no explicit limitation to
those foreseeable. Hence, injuries from development risks were apparently
also included within the scope of coverage. 86
83. Rojo, supra note 4, at 1271. "Given its great breadth, the scope of this special strict
liability system seems to be greater than that of the general liability system." PemAn Domecq, supra
note 3, at 143. "The wide scope of this Article [28] means that what was intended to be a rule
applicable only in exceptional cases, turns out to be the general rule . . . ." Mullerat & Cortes,
supra note 12, at 355-56. "It [the Article 28 rtgime] is given such a broad substantive scope that in
practice it operates with priority." Maria Elena Zabalo Escudero, La Ley Aplicable a la
Responsabilidad por Dahos Derivados de los Productos en el Derecho Internacional Privado
Espahol, 43 REVISTA ESPAROLA DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL 75, 81 (1991). "Finding a product
which does not fit into Article 28 of the GAC and which must follow the fault liability regime is
rather difficult." Diaz, supra note 2, at 763-64. But cf. BRUGGEMANN, supra note 21, at 86 (citing
one's scholar's questioning of whether handicrafts and agricultural products in their natural state
would fall under article 28).
84. Rojo, supra note 4, at 1272. Cf. BRUGGEMANN, supra note 21, at 99 (citing opinion in
the literature that under Article 28, principles of comparative negligence would also apply, thereby
reducing a negligent plaintiff's recovery). Id. at 100-02 (noting some scholars' opinion that such
defenses as "assumption of risk," "victim predisposition to the injury," and "fortuitous
circumstances" would also be available under Article 28).
85. Rojo, supra note 4, at 1265; Diaz, supra note 2, at 761. Since article 28 itself contains no
indication of liable persons, the authorities cited both argue that they must be the same as those
enumerated in Article 27. But see BROGGEMANN, supra note 21, at 93-96 (citing with approval the
line of scholarly opinions that would confine a liable party's liability to those product risks
specifically arising within the latter's sphere of activity).
86. Id; see also Dfaz, supra note 2, at 764; cf. Pemn Domecq, supra note 3, at 154 (opining
that foreseeability requirements go along with negligence-based liability); Rojo, supra note 4, at
1270 (noting that lack of foreseeability is a defense under the general regime of Articles 26-27);
BROGGEMANN, supra note 21, at 90-92 (noting split of opinion in the literature, but opining that the
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Even though the de facto generalization of a regime of strict
products liability may have come about more by sloppy draftsmanship than
perhaps by conscious design, the substantive result would still appear to be a
major advance for consumers. But that appearance is rather deceptive,
because of the definition of "consumers and users" the protected class
created by the GAC. These were defined as "natural or legal persons who
acquire, utilize or enjoy, as destinatarios finales [end-recipients], personal or
real property, products, services, activities or functions, whatever may be
the nature, public or private, individual or collective, of those who produce,
supply, furnish or extend them."81 Whereas, under the Civil Code it had
been the limited class of persons in privity of contract with a products
liability defendant who could benefit from the advantages of a contract
theory over a tort theory, under the GAC, it was now only "end-recipients"
or "end-users" who could benefit from the no-fault regime. Because
membership in the two classes, "those in privity with the products liability
defendant" and "end-users" of a product or service, would in the normal
course of things, substantially overlap, it was roughly speaking, the same
limited class which would benefit from the more advantageous theory of
recovery." All third parties and all bystanders, being neither "consumers"
nor "users" for purposes of the GAC, would continue to be relegated to the
Civil Code's presumed-fault tort regime under Article 1902.89
peseta cap in Article 28.3 is a "strong indication of intentional inclusion of liability for development
risks").
87. GAC art. 1.2 (emphasis added).
88. While many, possibly most, products and services will be purchased by those who will
eventually use them, the GAC would protect, for example, donees or thieves from the contract-
purchaser, while depriving the latter of its benefits. It would also apparently not protect a private
person who uses a product and subsequently re-sells it. Another peculiarity, much criticized, is the
inclusion of "legal persons" within the definition of "consumers and users." The intention was,
presumably, to include such presumptively not-for-profit organizations as churches and charities
within the definition. But the language of the definition does not make this clear. Hence, one
business suing anther might well be, in certain circumstances, a "consumer" for purposes of this
Act. See the discussion in Rojo, supra note 4, at 1262-64.
89. But cf BROGGEMANN, supra note 21, at 97 (noting the proposal of some scholars for a
contra legem interpretation of Article 28 so as to include third parties on policy grounds).
There were other problems with the Article 28 rgime as well. For one thing, there is much
disagreement over how the 500 million peseta cap, apparently intended as a counterweight to the
strict nature of the liability itself, was to be applied: per person, to all claims arising from the same
defect, to all products made or supplied by a liable party, to ech specific series of products, or per
defect. Diaz, supra note 2, at 764; BROGGEMANN, supra note 21, at 92; PemAn Domecq, supra
note 3, at 144; BROGGEMANN, supra note 21, at 98 (citing Bercovitz y Rodriguez Caflo); Mullerat
& Cortes, supra note 12, at 361; Rojo, supra note 4, at 1272. Would amounts paid out under a fault
theory count towards the cap? Rojo, supra note 4, at 1272-73; cf. BROGGEMANN, supra note 21, at
105 (implying that when limit was reached there might still be additional recovery under Civil
Code's fault regime).
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IV. THE EEC PRODUCTS LIABILITY DIRECTIVE
A. Background
In 1968, the Commission of the European Economic Community
undertook preliminary studies for the drafting of a Directive to harmonize
the products liability laws of the various member states.90 Subsequently, in
October of 1972, European heads of state and government, meeting in Paris,
called upon European community institutions "to strengthen and coordinate
measures for consumer protection."9I That same month, a "Convention on
the Law Applicable to Products Liability" was adopted under the auspices of
the Hague Conference on Private International Law.Y
On April 14, 1975, the European Council passed its resolution on a
preliminary program for consumer protection and information policy. 91 In
September of the following year, the European Commission submitted to the
Council of the European Communities its "proposal for a Council Directive
relating to the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative
provisions of the [m]ember [s]tates concerning liability for defective
products. "9' This was followed, in January of 1977, by the Council of
Europe's adoption of the "European Convention on Products Liability in
Regard to Personal Injury and Death." 5 In turn, the latter would serve as a
significant source ' for the European Council's July 25, 1985 "Directive on
the Approximation of the Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions
of the Member States Concerning Liability for Defective Products."17
Another area of doubt was the limitations period for bringing an action: the standard 15 year
period under the Civil Code Article 1964 for actions not otherwise specified, or the one year allowed
by Civil Code Article 1968, or either, depending on whether a contractual relationship is present or
the one year allowed by Civil Code. Article 1968. Pem,n Domecq, supra note 3, at 145; Tirado
Surez, supra note 69, at 4976; cf. BROGGEMANN, supra note 21, at 102 (arguing for one year but
noting that question would ultimately have to be answered by case law); Mullerat & Cortes, supra
note 12, at 360; cf. Cavanillas Mdigica, supra note 21, at 4479; Rojo, supra note 4, at 1277 (noting
silence of Spanish law on limitation period for bringing the action). A discussion of the remaining
articles of chapter VIII is not necessary for the present discussion.
90. Dfaz, supra note 2, at 771. Two years later, a special commission of the Council of
Europe took on the task of proposing harmonization measures in this area as well. Id.
91. 1975 O.J. (C 92) 1.
92. Hague Conference on Private International Law: Convention on the Law Applicable to
Products Liability [adopted Oct. 21, 1972] 11 I.L.M. 1283 (1972). For a discussion of the
interaction of this Convention and Spanish law, see generally Zabalo Escudero, supra note 83.
93. 1975 O.J. (C 92) 2
94. 1976 O.J. (C 241) 9 (later amended by 1979 O.J. (C 271) 3).
95. European Convention on Products Liability in Regard to Personal Injury and Death
(1995), 16 I.L.M. 7 (1977).
96. Pemdn Domecq, supra note 3, at 148; Rojo, supra note 4, at 1255.
97. 1985 O.J. (L 210) 29.
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Writing about a year after the Directive's adoption, Hans Claudius
Taschner, staff member of the EEC Commission, described it as follows:
The Directive is the result of a compromise achieved with
difficulty among the Member States, but also among the
naturally very much opposed interests of industry and
consumers. Member States' laws are quite diverse
[hdt6rog~nes]. They range from traditional liability for
fault with classic burden of proof . . . to de facto strict
liability, unlimited as to amount and length of time, as
progressively introduced by case law's tilting of an
irrefutable presumption of fault . . . passing through
liability for fault with reversal of the burden of proof, with
ever more rigorous conditions on making proof to the
contrary....
As for the social partners, industry sought the maintenance
of liability for fault or, in the event of strict liability, its
overall and specific limitation to as weak a level as
possible, exclusion of development risks, exclusion of
property damage, and limitation of liability to a duration of
five years; as for consumers, they considered that
safeguarding their interests would necessarily come via
strict liability unlimited as to amount and duration and
extending to development risks, via liability for property
damage with no threshold amount, and via reversing the
making of proof to make it the producer's burden as far as
the causal nexus between defect and damage goes.
Given positions this far apart, it is hard to see how one
could hold it against the Directive that it did not result in a
rapprochement of national laws, but on the contrary in an
accentuation of their diversity. The adoption of the
Directive was only achieved at a price of temporarily
maintaining a certain number of established rules. It
remains no less the case that the keystone of the Directive,
to wit the introduction of strict liability, which all alone
justifies all the efforts and relegates all other question to
the background, has been accepted without exception or
reserve by all Member States. 98
98. Hans Claudius Taschner, La Future Responsabilitg du fait des Produits Difectueux dans la
Communauti Europdene, 297 REVUE DU MARCHI COMUN 257, 258 (1986) (omitting examples).
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From Taschner's description of the genesis of the Directive, one can get a
fairly good sense of both its setting and its accomplishments: (1) a pre-
existing diversity of national laws; (2) opposing interests;" (3) attempted
"harmonization" around the core idea of strict liability;'1° and (4)
incomplete harmonization achieved.'°' A very brief summary of some of
its more important terms follows.
B. Summary of Provisions
Strict Liability: Apart from its clear embrace of strict liability' °0 in
the recitals, the operative provisions of the Directive which embody this
principle are Articles 1 and 4, which together provide for a "producer's"
liability for his product's defect, if the injured person can prove damage,
defect and a causal relation between the two. What this formulation leaves
99. Heinz Kr6ger, Probl~mes D'application de la Directive Europiene dans les Diffirents
Etats Membres, 32 ANNALES DE LA FACULTI DE DROIT DE LIGE 298 (1987).
The adoption of the Directive has provisionally put an end to an important part of the
debate in the E.E.C. regarding future European laws on the topic of liability for
damages caused by defective products. The debate which has concluded, to my mind,
brought with it neither winner nor loser. By that I understand that neither the
consumer organizations who actively sought the Directive, nor organizations .. .
representing industry which were against certain aspects of the proposed Directive and
which for that reason were reticent, indeed against the Directive, completely carried
the day.
Id.
100. See Bernstein, supra note 42, at 676 (arguing passim that the purported
"harmonization," in the (minimalist) sense of "approximation," "an effort to unify, with minimal
change of law," was not so much what the Commission was after as harmonization in the
"meliorist" sense of law reform, "reconcil[ing] national laws with a Community ideal"). But she
goes on to criticize the underlying idea behind the reform: "The Community has slighted its
combination of assured compensation [through Member States' social-welfare safety net] and well-
developed principles of liability in favor of an alternative known chronically to fail as a source of
compensation and to waste money." Id. at 689. She attributes this to the "sense of finitude"
engendered by the rising costs of state health-care programs. "In the spirit of austerity that began in
the mid-1980's, many Europeans regard universal health care as a luxury of potentially infinite
expense." Id.
101. See generally, e.g., Wolfgang Freiherr von Marschall, The Three Options of the EEC
Directive on Products liability and their Application in the Implementing Statutes of Member States,
1991 REVUE DE DROIT DES AFFAIRES INTERNATIONALE 707; cf. Bernstein, supra note 42, at 676
("mhe increasing amount of leeway that the Commission now condones will assure divergent
national laws in perpetuity.").
102. The English language text does not use the term "strict liability" but rather "liability
without fault." The French equivalent is responsabilitO objective. For the use of the responsabiliti
objective to mean strict liability, see, for example, Zabalo Escudero, supra note 83, at 80 n.23
(noting the 1973 Hague Convention's use of French term as equivalent to American "strict
liability"); see also Bernstein, supra note 42, at 680 ("The origins of the Directive suggest an
appreciation for American-style forthright strict products liability....").
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out, of course, is any need to show the producer's fault. Article 2 identifies
"products" as most moveables, including those that have been incorporated
into something else, and electricity, but excluding unprocessed agricultural
products and game. A product is defective if it does not provide the safety a
person is entitled to expect under the circumstances. 03 Exculpatory clauses
or limitations of this liability are not enforceable. '°
Protected Class: Under Article 4, prospective enforcers of this
liability, i.e., products liability plaintiffs, are simply "injured persons" with
no requirement of a contractual relationship with anyone. Third parties and
bystanders have just as much protection under the Directive as parties to a
contract. The only caveat is that the injured person's own fault, or the fault
of someone legally in his charge, may, but need not, cut down or cut off his
recovery.'0 But the negligence of all other persons, if it is a coparticipant in
causing the damage, in no way affects the injured person's right to recover
against the producer.10
Liable Parties: Article 1 identifies the "producer" as liable for the
damage caused by product defects. As defined by Article 3, "producer" is
an umbrella term, and includes: (1) manufacturers of finished products or
component parts; (2) producers of raw materials; (3) "own branders," i.e.,
those holding themselves out as manufacturers or producers; (4)
commercial importers into the EU;' °0 and (5) provisionally, any suppliers
of the product.°8 If, on the facts of a given case, there is more than one
"producer," they are to be jointly and severally liable, with any national law
rights regarding apportionment of the loss inter sese unaffected thereby.'°9
Possible Defenses to Liability: Apart from the plaintiff's own fault
or that of one legally in his charge, the more useful defenses" available to
producers are the "development risks" defense,", unless national law opts to
103. Directive, supra note 11, art. 6.
104. Id. art. 12.
105. Id. art. 8.2.
106. Id. art. 8.1. The producer is free to exercise any rights under national law to seek
contribution from such negligent person. Id.
107. An importer deemed a producer and held liable as such may have certain rights against
the actual producer. Directive, supra note 11, art. 3.2.
. 108. Suppliers may discharge this provisional liability by giving the injured party, within a
reasonable time, the identity of the actual producer or importer or of his own immediate supplier.
Id. art. 3.3.
109. Id. art. 5.
110. Davis, supra note 30, at 126-27.
111. Directive, supra note 11, art. 7(e). The "development risks" defense was apparently
added in response to pressure from the European Parliament. See, e.g., 1980 O.J. (C 147) 122-23
(parliamentary resolution endorsing development risks defense). The 1979 Amended Proposal did
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eliminate it, as it may, ' 2 and if one is a "producer" by virtue of having
manufactured a component part, proof that the defect causing the damage is
due to overall product design or to having followed the product
manufacturer's instructions."'
Scope of Allowable Damages: Under Article 9, the injured person is
always entitled to damages for death or personal injuries. Apparently, this
entitlement refers only to the material damages, because there is a reference
back to national law for the possible availability of nonmaterial damage.
There is no attempt to introduce uniformity into the calculation of those
damages.' '1 The injured person is also always entitled to property damage
for certain property, provided the damage is over an amount of 500
European Currency Units [ECU's]. The property damaged must be
consumer property. If the property was either not ordinarily intended for
personal use or consumption or not mainly so used by the injured party,
which basically means capital goods, there is no recovery allowed. The
Directive does not affect contract and tort rights which an injured person
may have under national law.'"
The Directive allows a person to exercise their rights within three
years of the date the injured person actually or constructively knew of the
damage." 6 In no event may they be exercised more than ten years from the
date the individual damage-causing product was put into circulation."' The
total damages which a producer might be required to pay as a result of
not contain any such defense. See 1979 O.J. (C 271) 3-11 (text of Amended Proposal); see also
supra text accompanying note 42.
112. Directive, supra note 11, art. 15.1(b).
113. Id. art. 7(f.
114. Andrew Geddes, Difficulties Relating to Directives Affecting the Recoverability of
Damages for Personal Injury, 17 EUR. L. REV. 408 (1992) (citing DAVID MCINTOSH &
MARJORIE HOLMES, PERSONAL INJURY AWARDS IN E.C. COUNTRIES (1991)).
The importance of making the correct choice [of forum] has been dramatically
illustrated by a recent survey of damage awards in different Member States. Taking
one example of a 40 year old male doctor who is married with two children and who
suffers serious brain injury, if he brings his proceedings in Ireland he would be likely
to receive something in the region of $2 million. If he brings his proceedings in Spain
on the other hand he would be lucky to receive $250,000. As the authors of the report
point out, until the Community introduces measures to iron out these disparities, forum
shopping will remain prevalent, settlement will be difficult and the single market ideal
of equal treatment in every Member State will be undermined.
Id.
115. Directive, supra note 11, art. 13.
116. Id. art. 10.
117. Id. art. 11.
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identical items with the same defect may, but need not, be capped by
national law at a minimum of seventy million ECU's.1 8
C. Implementation in Member States' National Law
The only three member states able to implement the Directive as of
July 30, 1988, were the United Kingdom, Italy, and Greece, with the latter
two only doing so by decree."19 In fact, "in the [European] Commission's
opinion, the only Member State which had correctly transposed the Products
Liability Directive into its national law was Greece," since the Commission
implemented infraction proceedings against both Italy and the United
Kingdom.'1°  In addition, Spain, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, France,
Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Portugal had not implemented
the Directive on time.' 2' One commentator, writing in 1993, bluntly stated
that "[tihe implementation record of most states in relation to this Directive
is nothing short of scandalous. . . . [I]t is extraordinary that France and
Spain have yet to implement the Directive."' 22 Another commentator a few
years earlier noted, "The (interim) balance which one might have struck at
the end of the period prescribed by Art. 19 of the EC Directive-the end of
July 1988-was simultaneously skimpy and surprising. "1 23
In March of 1990, the European Parliament asked "[w]hat urgent
action does the [European] Commission intend to take against the Spanish
Government [for nonimplementation of the Directive]?"124  Shortly
thereafter, the Commission provided a written answer in which it indicated
118. Id. art. 16.1.
119. Willibald Posch, Die Umsetzung der EG-Richtlinie 'Produlahaftpflicht" in den
Mitgliedstaaten und die beim "Autonomen Nachvollzug" durch Drittstaaten Auftretenden Probleme,
in SYMPOSIUM STARK: NEUERE ENTWICKLUNGEN IM HAFTPFLICHTRECHT 85 (Heinrich Hansell
& Heinz Rey eds., 1991). This Article will not deal with the question of whether, given the failure
to make timely implementation of the Directive in national law, the Directive's provisions therefore
took "direct effect" therein. See Diaz de Lezcano Sevillano, supra note 2, at 790-92.
120. D. Struyven, La Transposition de la Directive Europiene en Matire de Responsabiliti
du fait des Produits Difectueux dans le Droit des itats Membres: Bilan et Perspectives, 66 REVUE
DE DROIT INTERNATIONALE ET DE DROIT COMPARI 140, 141 (1989).
121. Bernstein, supra note 42, at 675 n.13. Subsequently, the European Union was enlarged,
on January 1, 1995, with the accession of new members Austria, Finland, and Sweden.
122. Christopher Hodges, EC: The European Minefield: Looking at EC Product Liability
Law, LLOYDS PRODUCT LIAB. INT'L, Sept. 1, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter
Textline File.
123. Mathias Schubert, Unsetzung der EG-Produkthaftungs-Richtlinie: Eine Zwischenbilanz,
36 RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFr 272 (1990).
124. EUR. PARL. DEB. (3-389) 199 (Apr. 4, 1990) (question no. 56 by Mr. Valverde Lopez,
H-367/90).
396 ILSA Journal of Int'l & Comparative Law [Vol. 2:371
that it had indeed begun "infringement proceedings" against
nonimplementing member states, but went on to say:
However, the Commission took the view that Spain as a
new Member State should be tacitly granted more time for
full implementation. But this does not mean that the
Commission could not now open infringement proceedings
against Spain at any time that seems appropriate, which
risks happening in the present case, as the Member State
has not yet communicated to the Commission the necessary
national measures for the implementation of the
directive. 12
Finally, as of August 3, 1995, "[a~ll EU member states, including the three
new members, have now transposed this directive except for France." 1'
V. THE SPANISH PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACT OF 1994
A. Legislative History
"A directive is an EC law addressed to Member Nations of the
Community. It is binding as to its result, but it leaves to each nation the
choice of form and methods to implement it. "121 Writing in 1988, one
Spanish commentator identified three possible implementation options open
to Spain:
125. Id. at 200; see also, e.g., EUR. PARL. DEB. (3-409) 214 (Oct. 9, 1991) (Commission's
written answer to parliamentary question indicating that nonimplementation proceedings had been
commenced against Ireland).
126. EU: Infringement Procedures Continue for Non-Transposition of Directives, AGENCE
EUROPE, Aug. 3, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter Textine File (list of the national
legal provisions which EU Member States have communicated to the Commission in connection with
the Directive is available in Westlaw, CELEX Library, NP file).
The Commission of the European Communities brought suit against France in the Court of
Justice of the European Communities on November 21, 1991. In January 1993, the Court held that
France's nonimplementation of the Directive constituted a failure to comply with its obligations
thereunder and under the EEC treaty. Affaire C-293/91, Commission c. Republique Franaise,
available in LEXIS, Eurocom Library, CJCE file (Jan. 13, 1993). In its filings with the Court,
France admitted the facts complained of, but indicated that it was having problems integrating the
Directive into existing French law, because the Directive's measures did not easily harmonize. Id.;
see also Dfaz de Lezcano Sevillano, supra note 2, at 789 (noting that French implementation of the
Directive was faced with two problems: "coordination with the discipline of the Code Civil and
coordination with special laws"). But see Rojo, supra note 4, at 1277 (noting that integration with
the Civil Code was the method being employed by the Dutch). For a discussion of the difficulty of
making changes in long-established civil codes, see generally SCHLESINGER ET AL., supra note 23,
at 547-52.
127. Bernstein, supra note 42, at 673 n.2 (citing Treaty Establishing the European
Community, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 189, 298 U.N.T.S. 11).
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[F]irst, modification of the Civil Code, by introducing into
the part relative to tort liability norms corresponding to the
manufacturer's liability. Second, modification of [the
GAC], revising articles 25 and following of said general
law and squeezing the Community rules within Chapter
VIII. Third, finally, the drafting of a special law.1'2
That commentator recommended the third option, and that position seems to
have prevailed relatively early in the process.'29 The process itself was
punctuated, not to say delayed, by three national elections: in 1986, 1989,
and 1993.' 30
Two drafts were prepared in 1988, one by the Commercial Law
section of the General Commission on Codification, in the Ministry of
Justice, dated January 28, 1988,1' and the other the work of the Ministry of
Health and Consumption, apparently following the issuance of a Report
commissioned by the National Institute on Consumption. 2 The Ministry of
Justice's bill, which basically followed the text of the Directive, included a
repeal of Articles 25 through 29 of the GAC, opted to include agricultural
products within the definition of "product," opted to put a global cap of ten
billion pesetas on damages from identical products with the same defect, and
allowed the "development risks" defense for products other than
pharmaceutical products.'33 The Ministry of Health and Consumption's bill
instead proposed merely amending the GAC to conform, where necessary,
to the Directive. It would, for example, have allowed the GAC to continue
to provide for recovery of property damage below the Directive's threshold
of 500 ECU's. It also opted to include "agricultural products" within the
definition of "product" and disallow the "development risks" defense for
both medicines and food.'3
128. Rojo, supra note 4, at 1277.
129. Cf. Struyven, supra note 120, at 154 n.28 (noting in 1989 "the Directive will be
implemented by means of a special law" and referring to early 1988 draft of same).
130. Cf. Spain, in THE STATESMAN'S YEARBOOK 1995 1201, 1203 (132d ed., Brian Hunter
ed.).
131. Mullerat & Cortes, supra note 12, at 361.
132. Pemin Domecq, supra note 3, at 158-59; Mullerat & Cortes, supra note 12, at 361.
133. Pemin Domecq, supra note 3, at 158; Directive art. 15.1 (a) (option to include "primary
agricultural products" and "game" within definition of "product"); id. art. 16.1 (option to cap global
damages for identical products having same defect).
134. Pemndn Domecq, supra note 3, at 159. But see Casals, supra note 12 (stating that food
products were excluded from the "development risks" defense only in 1993). The National Institute
on Consumption's report, also proposing the amendment of the GAC, would apparently have also
used the latter to supplement the Directive's ten year period after which consumers' rights were
extinguished. It also accepted the global cap, and the exclusion of capital goods from coverage.
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Another draft was prepared in early 1991. It excluded primary
agricultural products, game and fish from the definition of "product," as
long as they had not undergone any processing. It would have required for a
supplier to discharge himself of his provisional liability as "producer" under
Article 3.3, he would have to inform the injured person of the identity of the
producer or his own immediate supplier within one month of receiving a
request therefor. The Directive had merely specified "within a reasonable
time." The bill permitted the "development risks" defense, a cap on global
damages of 10.5 billion pesetas, and allowed the injured person's own
contributory negligence affect his recovery. ' 35
Finally, in 1993, there was another bill from the Ministry of Justice.
It declared Articles 25 through 28 of the GAC inapplicable to damages
covered by the Directive. It apparently accepted the exclusion of game, fish
and primary agricultural products from the definition of covered products,
the global cap of 10.5 billion pesetas, and set the threshold amount for
recoverable property damage at 75,000 pesetas.'36 The 1993 Justice Ministry
Bill appears to have served as the basis for the eventual 1994 Act.
B. Summary of Key Provisions of SPLA
The SPLA was promulgated on July 6, 1994 and published the next
day in the Official State Bulletin.'" The Preamble to the Act states that its
purpose is the adaptation of Spanish law to the Directive which it describes
as, the opinion of many commentators to the contrary notwithstanding,
"aim[ing] to achieve a substantially homogeneous legal regime within
Community boundaries," and refers to the "format" decision of opting to
draft a new law to take the place of the GAC.' 31 The details which the
Preamble highlights are: (1) a regime of "strict but not absolute" liability
and the limited defenses available to the manufacturer; (2) coverage of
There was some question about whether the Article 13 of the Directive, a savings clause for "rights
[under] a special liability system existing at the moment when this Directive was notified," would
technically permit the maintenance of the GAC. The specific situation the Commission had in mind
was apparently Germany's Pharmaceuticals Law. But some argued that the GAC also qualified as
such a "special liability system." See Rojo, supra note 4, at 1279-81.
135. Mullerat & Cortes, supra note 12, at 361-62. The authors do not make clear to what
extent the "development risks" defense was to be permitted.
136. Pemn Domecq, supra note 3, at 159.
137. For the reference to the official publication, see supra note 18. An English translation of
the SPLA appears in an Appendix infra. For a brief discussion in English, see Ram6n Mullerat,
New Product Liability Law in Spain, 22 INT'L BUS. LAW 418 (1994).
138. See infra Appendix. All other quoted language in this section is taken from the
translation of the SPLA in the Appendix, unless the context indicates that it is taken from the
Directive and/or a footnote further identifies the source.
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physical injury and property damage over 65,000 pesetas; (3) designation
of "those harmed by the defective product," or injured persons, as the
protected class, whether or not they qualify as "consumers in the strict
sense" (presumably that of the GAC); (4) the ten-year duration of the strict
liability created, accompanied by the curious apologia that "it is a
reasonable period of time if one takes into account the Bill's objective
range of application, which is limited to movable goods and gas and
electricity"; and (5) the exercise of the option to put a global cap on
damages a manufacturer may have to pay for "personal" damages caused
by identical articles having the same defect.
Strict Liability: Article 1 of the SPLA follows Article 1 of the
Directive, making "manufacturers" and "importers" (Directive:
"producers") liable for damages caused by the products they manufacture or
import. Article 5 of the Act, tracking Article 4 of the Directive, states that
the injured party who seeks to recover must prove "the defect, the damage
and the causal relation between both." Adhering to the text of Article 2 of
the Directive, SPLA Article 2 defines "product" as all moveables except
primary agricultural products and game, plus gas and electricity. In other
words, the option under Article 15.1 (a) to count primary agricultural
products and game as "products" was not exercised. The addition of "gas"
goes beyond the text of the Directive, but is arguably within its spirit.
Most of SPLA Article 3, "Statutory Definition of Defective
Product," follows Article 5 of the Directive by defining a defective product
as one "not offer[ing] the safety that might legitimately be expected" under
the circumstances, and also by eliminating the argument that an item is
defective because it subsequently appears in an improved version. However,
accepting an amendment proposed by Izquierda Unida, the ex-Communist
party in the Cortes, SPLA 3.2 departs from the text of the Directive by
adopting verbatim a feature of the Italian Products Liability Decree, to the
effect that "[i]n any event, a product is defective if it does not offer the
safety normally offered by other examples in the same series." By side-
stepping the possibly complicated task of having to show what degree of
safety might "legitimately" be expected of a product, this provision
facilitates plaintiff's proof. '39 Article 14 of the Act reproduces the substance
of Article 12 of the Directive, to the effect exculpatory clauses and clauses
limiting liability are "inoperative."
Protected Class: As highlighted in the Preamble, the protected class
under the SPLA is identified by Article 6 as "the injured person."
Following the option provided by Article 8.2 of the Directive, SPLA article
139. Casals, supra note 12 (criticizing SPLA Article 3.2 for impeding the Directive's aim of
developing "a unified concept of defect").
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9 permits the contributory negligence of the injured person, or of one for
whom the latter is civilly liable, to reduce or eliminate the manufacturer's or
importer's liability. Like the Directive's Article 8.1, the SPLA's Article 8
makes the intervention of a third party, other than the one mentioned in the
previous sentence, although a joint cause of the damage together with the
product defect, ineffective to reduce the manufacturer's or importer's
liability to the injured person. The manufacturer or importer, may,
however, subsequently seek a proportionate contribution from the third
person after having satisfied his obligation to indemnify the injured person.
Liable Parties: As mentioned above, whereas Article 1 of the
Directive makes "producers" liable for the damage done by their defective
products, the Act's Article 1, still following the Directive's substance, breaks
up that umbrella term into its basic components, "manufacturers" and
"importers," probably for linguistic reasons. Counting as "manufacturers"
are manufacturers of finished products, manufacturers of component parts
and "own-branders," as well as producers of raw materials. For
"producer," the Spanish text uses the same word, fabricante, that with the
others is translated "manufacturer." The "importers" who are liable under
the act are commercial importers into the EU.
Under Article 4.3 of the SPLA, a supplier of the product is
provisionally deemed a manufacturer unless he informs the injured person
within three months of the identity of the unknown manufacturer or
importer, or of his own immediate supplier. The Directive has a "within a
reasonable time" requirement. However, an "additional provision" of the
Act, appearing towards the end, further provides that any supplier who
supplies a product knowing of the existence of the defect is liable as though
he were the manufacturer or producer. But if he is held so liable, he has a
claim against the manufacturer or importer. There is no parallel to this
provision in the text of the Directive.
Article 7 of the Act, following Article 5 of the Directive, provides
for joint and several liability of more than one liable person under the Act.
Possible Defenses to Liability: Besides the injured person's own
fault under SPLA Article 9, Article 6 of the Act, in keeping with Article 7 of
the Directive, includes the two useful defenses of "development risks"-
except as to "pharmaceutical products, foodstuffs or food products intended
for human consumption" and the "sub-component" defense, where a
component part is incorporated into a defectively designed product or the
manufacturer or importer of the part has simply followed the product
manufacturer's instructions. The exception to the "development risks"
defense is a partial exercise of the option provided by Article 15.1 of the
Directive, which allowed reinstatement of liability for "development risks"
in implementing legislation once the member state followed a notification
400 [Vol. 2:371
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procedure.'14 The Directive itself neither prohibits nor endorses such partial
reinstatements of development risks liability.
With respect to the elimination of the "development risks" defense
on "pharmaceutical products, foodstuffs, or food products," Professor
Casals stated:
The practical consequences of the new provision go much
further than the German Pharmaceutical Act [of] 1976.
Thus, in comparison to the German Act, there is no
distinction between prescription and over-the-counter
drugs; liability refers both to physical injury and to
property damage, and the concept of drug established by
Spanish law is much wider. '4
The definition of "food" is found in the Spanish Food Code. The
same Code defines the concept of "food product" (producto alimentario),
which includes additives and other substances without any nutritional value
used in food processes. 4 2
Scope of Allowable Damages: Paralleling article 9 of the Directive,
SPLA Article 10.1 allows recovery of damages for death and bodily injury
and for damages to noncapital, consumer goods-objectively so intended and
subjectively, in the main, so used-over a threshold amount of 65,000
pesetas. Following the tenor of Article 13 of the Directive, Article 10.2 of
the Act is a savings clause which preserves the right to be compensated for
other damages and injuries, including pain and suffering, under the general
civil law. Under the "third final provision" of the SPLA, this amount may
be changed by the Government in accordance with periodic revisions by the
Council of the European Union.
Article 12 of the SPLA sets a three-year statute of limitations on the
bringing of an action, "from the date the injured person suffered the injury,
from either the product defect or the damage that said defect occasioned him,
provided the party liable for such injury is known." Presumably the quoted
language is meant to indicate, in a roundabout sort of way, what Article 10.1
of the Directive stated: "The limitation period shall begin to run from the
day on which the plaintiff became aware, or should reasonably have become
aware, of the damage, the defect and the identity of the producer."'14 Article
140. None of the sources consulted indicated whether Spain followed the notification
procedure outlined in Article 15.2 of the Directive with respect to this provision.
141. Casals, supra note 12.
142. Id.
143. 1985 O.J. (L 210) 31.
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12 of the Act goes on to insert a one-year limitation period on actions by a
liable party seeking contribution from another.
As instructed by Article 11 of the Directive, Article 13 of the SPLA
extinguishes all rights of injured persons "ten years from the date the specific
product causing the injury was placed into circulation."
The Act's Article 11 places a global cap of 10.5 billion pesetas on
damages stemming from deaths or personal injuries caused by identical
products showing the same defect. This exercises Article 16. 1's option with
respect to the capping of damages. Under the "third final provision" of the
SPLA, this amount too may be changed by the Government in accordance
with periodic revisions by the Council of the European Union. 144
Partial Repealer of GAC: The "first final provision" of the Act
makes Articles 25 through 28 of the GAC inapplicable to civil liability for
damages caused by "defective products" within the meaning of the Act.
Further discussion and observations on the SPLA will be made in Part VI.
VI. THE SPLA COMPARED
A. The SPLA and Post-Directive European Products Liability Law
One explicitly stated rationale for the Directive was "because the
existing divergences [in member states' laws] may distort competition and
affect the movement of goods within the common market and entail a
differing degree of protection of the consumer. "'4 The antidote administered
by the Directive was a self-described "approximation" of member states'
laws. 14 6  The very word chosen, "approximation," or "drawing closer,"
suggests that substantive 'equalization' of member states' laws, which
perhaps alone could truly eliminate market distortions and differential
protections, was not in sight, nor intended to be.
That having been said, two policy questions then surface: How
close do member states' laws need to be brought in order to achieve
significant diminution of market distortions; and should the desired degree of
proximity ever properly be achieved at the cost of diminishing the protection
144. Quaere whether this language establishing the cap means that the damage to non-capital
consumer property which accompanies a death or personal injury is uncapped. Furthermore, since
neither the Act nor the Directive states that death or personal injury is a prerequisite to the
recoverability of damages to noncapital consumer property, quaere whether consumer property
damages occurring apart from death or personal injury are equally uncapped. One could argue that
since the cap provisions only speak to "damage resulting from a death or personal injury," both
kinds of property damage are uncapped. Whether this was intended, or is sensible policy, is another
matter. The interpretive question is posed by the language of the Directive as well as of the
implementing legislation.
145. Directive, supra note 11, pmbl. para. 5.
146. Id.
402 [Vol. 2:371
Ansaldi
afforded to consumers by member states whose antecedent products liability
regime had progressed further, from a consumer perspective, than the
Directive's? The likely answers to these global questions would tend to
point each in a different direction on the permissible contents of post-
Directive national products liability laws. On the one hand, because of the
concern with advancing consumer interests, evidenced by the text of the
Directive and its pre-history,"4 the latter should certainly not be construed so
as to leave some European consumers effectively worse off than before. On
this interpretation, the Directive would be taken only as establishing a
minimum, a guaranteed "floor" of protection, below which the national law
of any member state might not fall.1'4 Member states would be free to make
their products liability laws more generous to consumers than the terms
mandated by the Directive.' 9 On the other hand, it might be argued that
because undesirable market distortions will only be removed the closer to
parity, member states' laws are brought, no more "divergences" should be
tolerated other than those the Directive explicitly permits. Ideally, those
divergences would eventually disappear. On this view, the Directive would
be both minimum and maximum, floor and ceiling, for European consumer
protection against defective products."
As a general matter, the precise quantum of legal approximation
necessary for significant diminution of market distortions is probably not
ascertainable ex ante. But even on the most restrictive reading of the
Directive; i.e., one that would yield the maximum possible "approximation"
of national laws, it is quite clear that the post-Directive products liability
regime in Europe has still had to tolerate a significant amount of
divergence.", The latter emanates from a variety of sources:
147. The Preamble to the Directive states that "insofar as [existing contract and tort
provisions of national law] also serve to attain the objective of effective protection of consumers,
they should remain unaffected by this Directive." 1985 O.J. (L 210) 30. For the pre-history of the
Directive, see supra text accompanying notes 90-101.
148. "The Directive only compels.. . a uniform minimum level of protection of the injured
'consumer' vis-4-vis that liable party who is a 'manufacturer.'" Gerhard Hohloch, Produkthaftung in
Europa, 2 ZEITSCHRIFr FOR EUROPAISCHES PRIVATRECHT 408, 430 (1994).
149. Cf. Pemin Domecq, supra note 3, at 157 (opining that post-directive Spanish law might
continue to allow for recovery of damages to defective goods themselves or to capital goods).
150. See, e.g., Rojo, supra note 4, at 1273. "What is involved is not a Directive of
minimums, expandable at the will of every State. In it is contained a special closed system of civilliability .. .." Id.
151. Hodges, supra note 122.
[T]he much vaunted 'level playing field' has not been created in relation to product
liability. Indeed, the [national divergences] could be said to reveal a playing field
which not only undulates but is peppered with unpleasant pitfalls for the unwary.
Depending on the viewpoint which is adopted, this is to the disadvantage of
manufacturers, importers, distributors, retailers and consumers.
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Some problems arise from the fact that the Directive
contains a number of optional provisions, which lead to
divergencies between the national laws of the Member
States. Other problems arise from the inherent nature of
legislating by directive, particularly that its terms do not
have direct effect but need to be implemented into national
legislation, which therefore allows for divergencies of
implementation, whether intentional or accidental. Other
problems arise from matters which are explicitly not dealt
with in the Directive, such as relevant aspects of national
law, practice, the legal systems and funding of litigation in
Member States. 52
The three options explicitly provided for' 3 are: (1) whether to include
"primary agricultural products"'I within the definition of "product;" (2)
whether to permit the so-called "development risks" defense;, and (3)
whether to include a global cap of at least seventy million ECU's on
damages payable by a producer "for death or personal injury... caused by
identical items with the same defect.'"16 Besides perpetuating a "differing
degree of protection of the consumer" to one extent or another,' 7 these
Id. "It can be said that, far from harmonising laws within the EU, the implementation of the
Directive has added a further layer of liability in the national law." Casals, supra note 21. See
also Struyven, supra note 120, at 151; Posch, supra note 119, at 113-14 ("The implementation of
the EC-Directive does not in fact lead to standardization of law, but merely to a limited
approximation that, due to highly relevant divergences in border-straddling products-liability
cases, makes the private international law in this area not obsolete even among Common Market
Member States."); Kr6ger, supra note 99, at 300 (Member States' options under the Directive
"obviously do not favor harmonization"); cf. Hohloch, supra note 148, at 434-35 (opining that
while what has been standardized predominates, Article 13 of the Directive "undoubtedly is also
leading down the road to renewed diversification and separate development of [national] laws
outside the core area [of standardization]").
152. Hodges, supra note 122.
153. Actually, there are four options. On the canonical three options, see generally Hohloch,
supra note 148, at 426, 431-32; Hodges, supra note 122; von Marschall, supra note 101, at 708 &
712; Rojo, supra note 4, at 1273; Struyven, supra note 120, at 148-50; and Kr6ger, supra note 99,
at 300-02.
154. Primary agricultural products are defined by the Directive as "the products of the soil, of
stock-farming and of fisheries, excluding products which have undergone initial processing."
Directive, supra note 11, art. 2. The Directive's default position is to exclude them from the
definition of "product." Id. Article 15. 1(a), however, allows Member States the option of including
them within said definition.
155. See BROGGEMANN supra note 21, at 111-12.
156. Directive, supra note 11, art. 16.1.
157. See, e.g., Geddes, supra note 114, at 417 (noting the "still ... very substantial
differences in Member States' laws governing personal injury awards arising out of product liability
claims [left by] the Directive").
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options and other divergences may well pose a threat to the goal of
eliminating market distortions.' 8 This result was probably preordained,
given the character of the Directive as a compromise agreement. 9
1. The Three Options
Primary agricultural products: As for "primary agricultural
products," the SPLA does not choose to include them within its definition of
"product."'"6 Earlier drafts of the law had, however, included them,'6' which
would tend to indicate this was a subject of some controversy. Such an
exclusion was prospectively criticized by one Spanish commentator, who
noted "European agriculture has nowadays largely become rather more of an
industrial process. The exclusion of primary agricultural products and game
is inspired more by political than legal reasons rooted in the support and
protection [given] to the agricultural sector, traditionally well protected by
Member States." 62
In this respect, Spain is among the majority of member states,
inasmuch as only three states, Luxembourg and two new member states,
Finland and Sweden, have opted to include primary agricultural products,
although a draft French law would apparently also include them. 3 Even so,
one scholar has opined that the divergence of national laws on this point may
in any event not be terribly significant, since processed foods are always
subject to liability and any additional liability imposed by an expanded
definition would not in practice extend to "spoilage [of fresh food products]
en route to the consumer." This is presumably because such spoilage would
not be a "defect" whose absence the donsumer is reasonably entitled to
expect but the liability would only relate to the "narrowly construed ...
growth phase" of such products.'"
158. See Hodges supra note 122. But cf. Bernstein, supra note 42, at 681-82 (wondering
whether the legal changes implemented pursuant to the Directive will have any effect at all on
decisions relating to the movement of goods, and if so, whether goods will be moved in a non-
desired direction).
159. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 98-101; von Marschall, supra note 101, at 707
(describing the Directive as "a compromise which was achieved after long discussions and
negotiations").
160. SPLA art. 2.1.
161. See supra text accompanying notes 133-34.
162. Diaz de Lezcano Sevillano, supra note 2, at 777; see also Rojo, supra note 4, at 1281
(recommending inclusion of primary agricultural products in definition of "product"). The European
food-processing industry was also in favor of the expanded definition, in light of Article 5 of the
Directive's provision regarding joint and several liability of two or more parties liable for the same
damage. Kr6ger, supra note 99, at 302.
163. These statistics are tabulated in Hodges, supra note 122.
164. Hohloch, supra note 148, at 432.
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Development Risks: Article 6.1 (e) of the SPLA makes a
"development risks" defense generally available, but Article 6.3 later
eliminates it with respect to "pharmaceutical products, foodstuffs or food
products." Such a limited acceptance of the defense was apparently an
agreed feature of the Spanish legislation from a rather early stage.'" But, by
partly allowing and partly disallowing the "development risks" defense,
Spain's position is an anomaly among EU member states.'" The great
majority of the latter, and France in draft form, have opted to permit the
defense; only Luxembourg and Finland have excluded it.167
One commentator described the legal differences in member states'
products liability laws on development risks as "more significant" than the
differences over primary agricultural products.' '6 Recently, a Spanish
scholar further opined that Spain's difference from other EU member states
would be especially pronounced in the area of pharmaceutical products.'"
By contrast, another writer indicated a belief that cases involving
development risks would be "extremely rare,"170 and this is seconded by a
commentator who observed "[t]he Directive's critics tend to overestimate the
scope of development risk liability. "171 Under the terms of the Directive, a
report was due to be filed by the Commission in 1995 on the development
risks defense, with a view to its possible complete elimination from the
Directive.72
Global Cap on Damages: Article 11 of the SPLA institutes a cap of
10.5 billion pesetas on "overall civil liability for death and personal injuries
caused by identical products showing the same defect." Such a cap was a
feature of the Ministry of Justice's draft as early as 1988,"7, and the idea of a
165. See supra text accompanying notes 133-35. The elimination of the defense doubtlessly
owes something to the "Toxic Oil Syndrome."
166. "To date, it seems that Spain has been the only country to answer [the development risks
question] with a peculiar 'No, but. .. .' " Casals, supra note 12.
167. Hodges, supra note 122; Hohloch, supra note 148, at 432. Hohloch wrongly reports
that the Swedish law has imposed development risk liability on manufacturers.
168. Hohloch, supra note 148, at 432.
169. See supra text accompanying note 141.
170. von Marschall, supra note 101, at 712.
171. Kathleen M. Nilles, Defining the Limits of Liability: A Legal and Political Analysis of
the European Community Products Liability Directive, 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 729, 761 (1985); see also
von Marschall, supra note 101 at 764.
172. Directive, supra note 11, art. 15.3.
173. See supra text accompanying note 133. It was apparently not a feature of the Ministry of
Health and Consumption's bill of the same year, which, however, would presumably have retained
the GAC's ambiguously applied 500-million cap. See supra text accompanying notes 89, 134.
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cap was explicitly endorsed by at least one Spanish expert in the area.'71
Here again, Spain is in the minority. Only three other member states,
Germany, Greece, and Portugal, have also exercised this option, while the
other eleven states, including France in draft, have not added such a
provision. What these numbers may reflect is a general tradition of
uncapped liability in European law'" and the suprisingly weak support of
European industry for the idea of a cap.7 6 Under the terms of the Directive,
the effects of the cap on consumer protection were likewise due for decennial
review in 1995.'"
Effect of Injured Party's Fault: Apart from the three widely
discussed options indicated above, the Directive expressly provides for an
additional option. Article 8.2 permits, but does not require, member states'
national laws to reduce or disallow a producer's liability when "the damage
is caused both by a defect in the product and by the fault of the injured
person or any person for whom the injured person is responsible." SPLA
Article 9 exercises this option.
2. Nonuniform Implementation
Definition of "Product": While having chosen to exclude "primary
agricultural products" from coverage, the SPLA went on to state that "gas
and electricity are [also] considered products."" The Directive, however,
had only specified that "'[p]roduct' includes electricity. "'11 This addendum
may be a reflection of the still rather widespread use of gas canisters, called
bombonas, to provide, for example, hot water in many Spanish households,
174. Rojo, supra note 4, at 1281.
175. Krdger, supra note 99, at 301; cf. Diaz, supra note 2, at 785 (noting "different traditions
among the member states").
176. Cited as reasons for this are the fact that "the proposed ceiling was so high that
businesses scarcely saw any advantages it might hold for them" and the fear some businesses in fact
felt that they might be "driven to insure themselves up to the ceiling even though their risks were in
fact less significant." Kr6ger, supra note 99, at 301-02. The basic theory behind the Directive's cap
has also been criticized on policy grounds: The choice of any figure as a financial cap is, of course,
entirely arbitrary.
The financial ceiling might be more justifiable if it were related mathematically to
factors such as the number of a given type of products in circulation in a country and
the size of the population of individual states. There is little justifiable correlation here
between the widely fluctuating population sizes of different states.
Hodges, supra note 122.
177. Directive, supra note 11, art. 16.2.
178. SPLA art. 2.2.
179. Directive, supra note 11, art. 2.
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as well as the fact that a number of leading decisions by the Tribunal
Supremo on products liability had involved gas explosions. '1
Definition of 'Defect': The Directive's basic definition of a defective
product is "not provid[ing] the safety which a person is entitled to expect."''
However, the SPLA superimposes another, more objective test: "In any
event, a product is defective if it does not offer the safety normally offered
by other examples in the same [product] series. "1 As indicated previously,
this more objective test was apparently added to facilitate plaintiff's ability to
meet the burden of proof, inasmuch as the Directive's general test of
defectiveness is a rather more open-ended and, hence, less predictable
inquiry.' 3
Suppliers' Liability: Where a producer or importer could not be
identified, the Directive made any supplier of the product provisionally liable
just as though he were a producer, unless he informed the injured person
"within a reasonable time" of the identity of the actual producer, importer,
or of his own supplier.'" The SPLA, instead, chooses to draw a bright line
and specifies that the supplier has three months to provide such
information.U3 In an earlier draft of the Spanish law, the period had been set
at one month.186 There is wide divergence here among the national laws of
member states.8 7
In another nonuniform provision, the SPLA additionally provides for
the nonprovisional liability of suppliers who "suppl[y] [a] product knowing
of the existence of the defect."lu For all that, such scienter liability may be
good policy, it has no basis in the text of the Directive.
180. See, e.g., Casals, supra note 12.
181. Directive, supra note 11, art. 6.
182. SPLA art. 3.2. The test was copied from the Italian Products Liability Decree.
183. See supra text preceding note 139.
184. Directive, supra note 11, art. 3.3.
185. SPLA art. 4.3.
186. See supra text preceding note 135.
187. By way of comparison, the Italian and Portuguese product liability laws also set a three
month period and the German law sets a one month period, whereas the Greek, Danish, English and
Austrian legislation followed the more open-ended "reasonable time" approach. By way of non-
binding interpretive aid, the Austrian government's commentary on the relevant section of its law
stated that normally a one to two week period is sufficient. Posch, supra note 119, at 97-98. Posch
also notes an opinion to the effect that such more precise definitions of the available time period as
that contained in the Spanish act contravene the Directive, going on to observe: "Here, precisely, is
it particularly clearly shown how far from complete is the approximation of laws within the Common
Market that the Directive aimed for." Id. at 96-97.
188. SPLA "Additional provision (one only). Supplier's liability."
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3. Subsistence of Background Law
Directive References to National Law: The Directive explicitly
states that national law continues to govern in the following five areas:
(1) contribution or recourse rights among two or more
jointly and severally liable persons;1 9
(2) contribution or recourse rights between a liable
producer and a contributorily negligent intervening
third-party; 19
(3) recovery for nonmaterial damage such as pain and
suffering; 91
(4) tolling of the statute of limitations;'1
(5) rights under rules of contract or tort [noncontractuall
liability and rights under any pre-existing "special
liability systems"' 93
Contribution and Recourse Rights: Article 7 of the SPLA establishes
joint and several liability for those persons, manufacturers, importers, or
suppliers, the Act makes liable for the same injury. Article 8 further
provides that a person found liable under the SPLA who has satisfied the
obligation to pay compensation to the injured party may then bring a claim
against a negligent third party for "the portion corresponding to his
intervention in causing the injury.""' In principle, it seems likely that such
rights would not vary widely from one member state to another.
Nonmaterial Damages: In light of the SPLA's repeal of Articles 25
through 28 of the GAC as to damages caused by defective products, the
background Spanish law on compensation for nonaterial damages, such aspain and suffering, will hence revert to the Civil Code's contract and tort
provisions discussed earlier. Both of them, as interpreted by the courts,
generally permitted recovery for nonmaterial damages.1 95 But a reversion to
the Civil Code to recover such damages will obviously entail the
reinstatement of some sort of fault analysis in Spanish products liability
189. Directive, supra note 11, art. 5.
190. Id. art. 8.1.
191. Id. art. 9.
192. Id. art. 10.2.
193. Id. art. 13; see also supra note 134.
194. Additional provisions regarding joint and several liability and contribution rights can be
found in Civil Code Articles 1137-48, 1195-1202.
195. See supra text accompanying notes 39 & 60.
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litigation. '" Such divergences as may exist on a theoretical level among the
various member states in their treatment of nonmaterial damages were
assessed by one commentator as often being merely apparent differences
which, to his mind, really had no discernible distorting effect on
competition. '1'
Tolling of the Three-Year Limitations Period: The Directive dictates
a three year limitations period for the bringing of an action, which begins to
run "from the day on which the plaintiff became aware or should reasonably
have become aware, of the damage, the defect, and the identity of the
producer."' '  In an awkwardly worded provision,'1 Article 12.1 of the
SPLA provides that an action must be brought "within three years from the
date the injured person suffered the injury, from either the product defect or
the damage that said defect occasioned him, provided the party liable for
such injury is known." It goes on to provide "[t]he tolling of the limitation
period is governed by provisions of the Civil Code."200
From the rather opaque language used, it is hardly crystalline that
the second part of the disjunctive phrase "three years from the date the
injured person suffered the injury, from either the product defect or the
damage that said defect occasioned him" is meant to cover subsequently
discovered injuries. Presumably, the SPLA intends to cover such situations;
for it not to do so would be extraordinarily regressive.201 However, in the
unlikely event that Article 12.1 of the SPLA is found not to extend to such
subsequently discovered injuries, however, it is clear that the referenced civil
law provisions tolling the statute of limitations would not be adequate to
bring them within the Act, whatever other lacunae they could be used to
fill.202
196. See supra text accompanying notes 34, 56-59.
197. See Hohloch, supra note 148, at 437-39.
198. Directive, supra note 11, art. 10.1.
199. See supra text accompanying note 142.
200. Directive, supra note 11, art. 12.2.
201. Cf. C.CIV. art. 1968.2. The general statute of limitations for civil actions for fault or
negligence under Civil Code article 1902 states that the same have to be brought within one year
"from [the time] the aggrieved party discovered it."
202. The general provisions on tolling are found in the Civil Code Articles 1973-1975. They
do not deal with the problem of after-discovered injury. Where American legal theory uses the one
umbrella term "tolling," Spanish legal theory distinguishes between the "suspension" of a Statute of
Limitations, which prevents its ever starting to run in the first place, and its "interruption" once it
has started running. Hence, it is the text of SPLA Article 12.1 itself which needs to contain rules
regarding the "suspension" of the three-year statute, since Article 12.2's reference to civil law only
relates to its "interruption." For a general discussion of tolling of the statute of limitations in the
context of the Civil Code Articles 1902. see SANTOS BRIZ, supra note 23, at 1045-68.
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Savings of Contract and Tort Rights: In addition to the just
mentioned possibility of contract or tort rights to recover nonmaterial
damages, the following eight types of damages have also been identified as
falling outside the scope of national legislation implementing the EEC's
Products Liability Directive:
1. Damage caused by products which were put into
circulation before the implementing date of the
legislation and which remain in circulation.
2. Damage [from development risks]....
3. Damage to the defective product itself.
4. Damage to commercial property.
5. Damage to personal property not in excess of 500
ECU.
6. Damage for which proceedings are not commenced
within three years from the plaintiff's date of actual or
constructive knowledge of the damage, the defect and
the identity of the producer.
7. Damage caused by a product which has been in
circulation for more than ten years.
8. Pure economic loss not caused by death or personal
injuries .1
As for defective products already in circulation when the new law
went into effect, the SPLA's single "transitional provision" provides that the
Act is inapplicable. Liability for such products latter "shall be governed by
the provisions in effect at said time." For such situations, then, the GAC or
the Civil Code will continue to provide the governing law.
With respect to the other items on the list, Article 15 of the SPLA
provides that actions brought thereunder "have no effect on other rights the
injured person may have as a result of the contractual or noncontractual
[tort] liability of the manufacturer, importer or of any other person." As a
result, it would appear that most, if not all,2 of the listed damages may
203. Hodges, supra note 122. Hodges opines that manufacturers' continuing uncertainty
about non-Directive based liability for development risks is particularly regrettable.
204. Liability for development risks was excluded under both the contract/obligations and tort
regimes. See supra text accompanying notes 42 & 61. However, there was a minimal development-
risk liability under the Sales theory. See supra text accompanying note 38. Damages not sought
within three years from the plaintiff's date of actual or constructive knowledge of the damage, the
defect and the identity of the producer would continue to be available only under a
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continue to be sought under the Civil Code's contract and tort provisions.
Of course, those damages may not be sought under the GAC since the SPLA
repealed its products liability provisions.-) Once again, as with nonmaterial
damages, this means that these damages are still recoverable, though only
upon proof, or unrebutted presumption, of the defendant's fault. Hence, one
Spanish scholar has indicated that he regards the continued vitality of the
civil code regime as assured: "[I]n practice it is likely that future claims
under the SPLA will be made with causes of action which would previously
have been used, pleaded in the alternative."6
Most of the member states, except France, have effectively
preserved contract and tort rights. I From a theoretical perspective, the
Directive's permitted savings of such rights should not result in a wide
degree of divergence among member states because most had previously
followed some sort of mixed contract-tort approach to products liability
questions in the time preceding the Directive.2 As a result, one scholar calls
the practical consequences of such differences "small" and "tolerable."0
Other Features of the Legal System: Far from inconsequential, at
least as it relates to the "bottom line" of compensation, are differential
practices of national court systems in measuring damages. Spanish courts
have at times been cited for the conservatism of their products liability
awards, as compared with other EU member states. 210  On the other hand,
Spain was identified by one commentator as belonging to a group of
countries making legal aid available, "particularly where there is no
assessment of the merits of a claim. "2, The high level of availability of legal
aid is a factor which may make it easier in Spain to bring products liability
lawsuits. 212
contract/obligations theory, which has a 15-year statute of limitations, but not under a tort or a sales
theory, which have limitations of one year and six months, respectively. See supra text
accompanying notes 38, 49-50, 64.
205. See supra text following note 144.
206. Casals, supra note 12.
207. Hohloch's attempted differentiation of Great Britain and Italy in this respect seems open
to question. See Hohloch, supra note 148, at 428, 429 n.93. Both the British and Italian laws have
explicit savings clauses. See Consumer Protection Act [United Kingdom], § 2(6) (1987) and Decreto
del Presidente Della Republica n. 224 del 24/05/88, Supplemento Ordinario Alla Gazzetta Uficiale
n. 56 de1 23/06/88 [Italian Products Liability Decree 1987], § 15.1.
208. See, e.g., supra note 30; Hohloch, supra note 148, at 413.
209. Hohloch, supra note 148, at 429, 430.
210. See Geddes, supra note 114 (contrasting Spain and Ireland).
211. Hodges, supra note 122.
212. Another theoretically "anti-consumer" feature of the Spanish legal system, one which it
shares with other Civil Law countries, is a lack of easy access to extensive documentation on
discovery. See SCHLESINGER ET AL., supra note 23, at 426-28. "Ease of access to extensive
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B. The SPLA and the GAC
Prior to the passage of the SPLA, many Spanish commentators
agreed that a comparison of the GAC with the legal regime set up by the
Directive would show consumer interests better protected by one over the
other. Hence, they saw a simple replacement of the GAC with the Directive
as a simultaneous improvement and worsening of consumer protection in
Spain.213 But if this was so, why not, when implementing the Directive,
adhere to the policy stated in the Directive's Preamble '14 and maintain the
GAC "to the extent it implies a plus in protection?"211
While the Spanish government was considering how best to
implement the Directive, one option some were arguing for was in fact the
maintenance in force of an amended GAC. 216  This option, however, was
ultimately rejected, and it is not hard to find compelling reasons to have
rejected it. Quite apart from the savage criticism of the GAC's
draftsmanship and its very intelligibility,2' there may have been a feeling that
the lavishly pro-consumer regime instituted by Article 28 was beyond what
was tolerable at that stage of development of Spanish society,2 18 having been
perhaps something of an overreaction to the Toxic Oil Syndrome. Hence,
one commentator argued, any attempt to have the best of both worlds, i.e.,
to keep the most attractive, pro-consumer, features of both, would lead to a
relative weakening of Spanish industry vis-4-vis its European competitors.2 1 9
Ultimately, the SPLA did in fact repeal Articles 25 through 28 of the GAC
as they related to "civil liability for damages caused by defective products
[as defined by the SPLA]."
documentation on discovery" is cited by Hodges as one of a number of features which are generally
regarded as "major risk factors" in product liability from a defendant's perspective. Hodges, supra
note 122 (singling out Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom (less Scotland) as presenting this
risk factor). On the other hand, under the SPLA parsimonious discovery is less likely to prove a
problem to injured Spanish consumers, inasmuch as the question of fault, whose access to such
documents would be most relevant, should not surface except at the margins.
213. PemAn Domecq, supra note 3, at 155; Mullerat & Cortes, supra note 13, at 363; Rojo,
supra note 4, at 1282.
214. See Directive, supra note 11, pmbl., para. 13.
215. Rojo, supra note 4, at 1280.
216. See supra text accompanying note 134; Diaz de Lezcano Sevillano, supra note 2, at 773
n.95 (citing opinion of Sequiera that GAC already provided and exceeded the level of protection
required by the Directive); cf. Rojo, supra note 4, at 1279-80 (arguing that the substance of GAC
Article 28 could be maintained under Article 13 of the Directive).
217. See supra text accompanying notes 74 & 89.
218. Rojo, supra note 4, at 1260-61, 1272.
219. Id. at 1282.
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One Spanish commentator has recently described his own and a
portion of the public's response to the SPLA as follows:
I thought the implementation of the EC Directive on
Products Liability would be an important step towards
more effective protection for consumers in Spain without
burdening manufacturers with unreasonable costs. Today I
doubt it. The editorial of last October's [1994] issue of
Dinero y Derechos (Money and Rights), a magazine
published by a Spanish consumer organisation, states that
the new Spanish Products Liability Act (SPLA) "will end
by creating more problems instead of offering solutions to
the victim"; it adds that judges were already showing the
right path to adapt Spanish law to the EC Directive, and
questions whether this new Act will mean a backward step
or not.n0
What accounts for the pessimistic tone of these reactions? Underlying it
must be a perception that the overall net position of Spanish consumers who
are products liability plaintiffs is worse under the SPLA than it had been
under the GAC. Is such a conclusion warranted by a comparison of the key
features of the two Acts?221
1. Improvements in the Consumer's Position Under the SPLA
Under the GAC, it was only "destinatarios finales," end-recipients
or end-users, who were defined as "consumers." Only "consumers," so
defined, could benefit from the virtually absolute liability of the GAC Article
28 "special" regime. All others were relegated to the Civil Code's fault-
based liability system with causes of action sounding either in contract or
tort.mn Given the SPLA's preservation of contract and tort rights, those
products liability plaintiffs whom the GAC had effectively confined to the
Code theories of liability are clearly not harmed by the passage of the SPLA.
They can now, in essence, choose between Civil Code and SPLA-based
causes of action or, as Professor Casals predicted, argue them in the
220. Casals, supra note 12.
221. For the sake of discussion, the following analysis adopts an avowedly partisan, purely
"pro-consumer" perspective as opposed to the more self-consciously "balanced" perspective of one
interested in the overall equilibrium and well-being of Spanish society. It assumes, then, that
increases in consumer rights and protections are social goods, without more, and vice versa. This is
done, however, solely to throw certain aspects of the SPLA into high relief. It is in no sense an
attempt to obviate a society's need to weigh consumers interests against others, to the possible
detriment of the former.
222. See supra text accompanying notes 87-89.
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alternative. 23 As a class, then, they can only be benefited from the SPLA.
It is only those plaintiffs who would previously have been eligible to sue
under the GAC, "consumers" narrowly defined, who may now be adversely
affected by its repeal. Alternatively, such plaintiffs may have been benefited
by the SPLA, to the extent that the latter's provisions are more advantageous
than the ones they replace.
Protected Class Broadened: There is one obvious feature of the
SPLA which may represent an improvement over the GAC for consumers.
This relates to the scope of the protected class under each. Whereas under
the GAC it was only "consumers" who could benefit from the virtually
absolute liability of the GAC Article 28 "special" regime, the SPLA by
contrast defines the protected class much more broadly as "injured
persons. "2 Consequently, the no-fault protection afforded by the latter Act
extends well beyond the confines of the GAC's "consumers." All
prospective products liability plaintiffs who would previously have been
slotted into the category of nonconsumers have now been benefited by their
admission to the SPLA's no-fault liability regime. Thus, to the extent that
the Civil Code regime continued to prove problematic even after judicial
establishment of a rebuttable presumption of defendants' fault,2  plaintiffs
who are ineligible for "consumer" status under the GAC are clearly better
off under the SPLA regime which largely dispenses with the fault inquiry.
By the same token, to the extent that the GAC's absolute liability provided
an even higher degree of protection to certain consumers than the SPLA's
strict liability, those plaintiffs who could previously have sued under the
GAC have clearly been harmed by being deprived of the latter. As a matter
of policy, the legal treatment of end-using and non-end-using products
liability plaintiffs no doubt ought to have been largely equalized. Whether
that equalization ought to have come about by lowering the protection of the
one and then raising the protection of the other to the same new level is
another matter.
On a statistical level, if the subset of product liability plaintiffs who
are not end-users is larger than the subset of plaintiffs who are, more people
would be benefited by the improved position of the former than would be
harmed by the worsened position of the latter. Hence, if this assumption is
correct, one might well say that, in this respect, there is a net improvement
in the position of Spanish consumers. On the other hand, if this statistical
assumption is incorrect, and end-users in fact preponderate among products
liability plaintiffs, then a greater number of Spanish consumers will have
223. See supra text accompanying note 206.
224. See supra text following note 139.
225. See supra text accompanying notes 63-66.
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been harmed by the relative contraction of their legal rights as compared to
the status quo ante under the GAC.
Without statistical data, of course, it is impossible to give anything
more than impressions about which of these assumptions is correct. To the
author, however, it appears intuitive, though no more than intuitive, that
"end-users" would constitute the great majority of products liability
plaintiffs. If so, then this aspect of the repeal of the GAC is obviously a
setback to the interests of more consumers than not. Nonetheless, it
indubitably provides a clear-cut benefit to some consumers, even if they turn
out to be numerically in the minority.
To this clear-cut benefit for those consumers previously
disadvantaged under the GAC, we may now perhaps add two rather
speculative benefits of the SPLA to the other consumers, those who would
have been entitled to sue under the 1984 Act. The first benefit relates to the
statute of limitations; the second to the cap on damages. These benefits must
perforce be viewed as speculative, owing to the lack of clarity in the GAC
itself.
Statute of Limitations Lengthened: Article 12 of the SPLA provides
for a three-year statute of limitations. Characteristic of its inartful drafting,
the GAC was silent on the limitations period. If the latter's limitation period
was in fact one year as some commentators argued,2 then those who would
previously have been "consumer" plaintiffs under the GAC as well as those
non-end users suing in tort,m were clearly benefited by the SPLA'S increase
of the limitations period to three years; even non-end-users suing in contract
probably benefited therebyY8u On the other hand, if the GAC's limitations
period was in fact fifteen years, as one commentator claimed,29 then those
who previously would have been consumer plaintiffs under the GAC were
obviously harmed by the SPLA's reduction of the time period for bringing
an action. However, since the weight of opinion, however, appears to be
with the one-year interpretation, one can venture a qualified judgment in this
226. See supra text accompanying note 89.
227. See supra text accompanying notes 50, 64.
228. Plaintiffs under a contract/obligations theory, which had a fifteen-year limitations period,
would not necessarily lose out if SPLA Article 15, which saves contract rights, is read as giving a
product-liability plaintiff the option of suing either under the SPLA or under the contract provisions
of the Civil Code (assuming he meets the factual predicates for the latter status). See supra text
accompanying note 49. Of course, if he chooses the latter route, that would come only at the cost of
re-instating a fault analysis. Should this prove too high a price to pay, the SPLA's apparent option to
sue in contract might well only rarely be exercised. In that case, those plaintiffs having the
theoretical option to sue in contract might be viewed as having had a trade off made for them: a
shorter limitations period in exchange for a lack of need to prove defendant's fault. In the calculus of
net benefit or loss, those plaintiffs would probably still be better off under the SPLA.
229. See supra text accompanying note 89 (opinion of Pemat Domecq).
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respect the SPLA's three-year period represents an advance in consumer
protection.
Higher Cap on Damages: Article 11 of the SPLA, exercising the
option provided under Article 16 of the Directive, implemented an overall
cap of 10.5 billion pesetas on liability "for death and personal injuries caused
by identical products showing the same defect." The GAC, for its part, had
a cap of 500 million pesetas on liability arising under Article 28's special
regime, with no indication of how it was to be applied.2" There are at least
four different ways the GAC's cap has been interpreted.231 If the GAC's cap
was (a) the same kind of cap as the SPLA's, i.e., a cap on all claims arising
from the same defect in the same product series; or (b) a cap on all claims
stemming from the same product series, albeit from more than one defect; or
(c) a cap on all no-fault damages payable by a given defendant, then the
SPLA's raising of the cap amount and/or making it a per defect cap, is a
major legal improvement. If, on the other hand, the GAC's 500 million
pesetas is simply a per person cap-which seems to be the best-reasoned
interpretation-then the SPLA's 10.5 billion peseta cap is, at least on a
theoretical level, a drawback for consumers. Once all claims totaled 10.5
billion pesetas, the SPLA's cap would be reached and no-fault liability would
be extinguished, whereas under the GAC there could have been an infinite
series of claims each totaling less than 500 million pesetas. Where this
difference could conceivably rise above the merely theoretical, of course,
would be in the area of mass torts.
2. Setbacks for Consumers Under the SPLA
Need to Prove Existence of Defect: Article 5 of the SPLA requires
that the injured person prove "the defect, the damage and the causal relation
between both." The defect that must be proven, according to Article 4, is a
failure to provide either "the safety which might legitimately be expected" or
"the safety normally offered by other examples in the same [product]
series." Article 28 of the GAC, by contrast, only required consumers to
prove "correct use [or] consumption of goods" and the damages it caused, a
formulation which totally dispensed with proof of product defect, as well as
defendant's fault.123 That the need to prove defectiveness was felt to be a
setback for consumers is probably indicated by the Cortes' adding to the
230. See supra text accompanying note 89.
231. See supra text accompanying note 89.
232. See supra text accompanying note 82. Pemdn Domecq, however, notes that the
product's defectiveness is clearly implied by the fact that its correct use or consumption caused
injury. Pemtn Domecq, supra note 3, at 144.
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Directive's definition of defectiveness a second, nonuniform way to prove
it.
233
Noninclusion of Agricultural Products: Article 2.1 of the SPLA
excludes from its definition of a "product," which could potentially give rise
to no-fault liability, "primary agricultural and livestock materials, and
products of hunting and fishing which have not undergone an initial
transformation. "234 Under the prevailing interpretation of the GAC, by
contrast, such products would most likely have been covered under the
special regime of article 28.25
Less Generous Calculation of Damages: SPLA Article 10.1
excludes liability for damage caused to the defective product itself and to the
plaintiff's nonconsumer capital goods. 236  That same article also allows
compensation for damage "consumer property" only to the extent it exceeds
65,000 pesetas. Under the GAC, virtually all types of damage were
covered,'7 including those excluded by the SPLA.
"Development Risks" Liability: With the exception of
"pharmaceutical products, foodstuffs or food products intended for human
consumption," Article 6 of the SPLA excludes liability for development
risks. Article 28 of the GAC, however, was generally interpreted as
creating liability for such risks. 2M
Contraction in Suppliers' Liability: Along with manufacturers and
importers, the SPLA also provides for provisional liability of suppliers
pending their timely identification of the manufacturer, importer or own
supplier, and nonprovisional liability of suppliers who supply a defective
product with scienter. 9 Article 28 of the GAC, though it contained no list
of liable parties, was interpreted to include as liable parties the manufacturer,
importer, seller, or supplier of a product to a consumer.2 ° The portion of
233. See supra text accompanying notes 182-83.
234. See supra text accompanying notes 160, 2.
235. See supra text accompanying note 83. There is perhaps an argument to be made here to
the effect that, since the SPLA technically only repealed Articles 25 to 28 of the GAC as they related
to "civil liability for damages caused by defective products within the meaning of article 2 [of this
Act]" (emphasis added), the GAC remains in force with respect to "products" not included in Article
2. Whether the argument would succeed, in the face of clear legislative intent to exclude primary
agricultural products and the like, seems unlikely, but it is at least a possibility.
236. For the sense in which the term "capital goods" is used, see supra text preceding note
115. Damages to the defective product itself and to non-consumer property may, of course, still be
sought under the appropriate Civil Code provisions. See supra text accompanying notes 202-05.
237. Penn Domecq, supra note 3, at 148; Rojo, supra note 4, at 1276.
238. See supra text accompanying note 86.
239. See infra Appendix arts. 1, 4, "additional provision."
240. See supra text accompanying note 85.
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the GAC's liability system which the SPLA thus eliminated, is a supplier's
liability for unknown defects.
Statute of Repose: Article 13 of the SPLA provides that an injured
person's rights are in any event extinguished ten years from the date the
injury-causing product was put into circulation. There is no comparable
provision under the GAC:
3. Partial Continuance of the GAC
The SPLA does not include liability for defective services. 2"1 Article
28 of the GAC, by contrast, explicitly included "services" within the scope
of the special system it set up. But inasmuch as the SPLA only repealed
Articles 25 to 28 of the GAC as they related to "liability for damages caused
by defective products," that portion of the GAC regime relating to liability
for services still continues in legal effect.24
4. Summary
Viewed at the micro level, the only relatively clear benefit to the
seeming majority of Spanish products liability plaintiffs from the SPLA is an
extended statute of limitations, though even that benefit is not free from
doubt. In every other respect the new Act represents a contraction of
protection for that group. On the other hand, another group of plaintiffs is
clearly benefited by the newly conferred ability to invoke a theory of strict
liability in seeking to recover for product injuries. While it is technically
true, as many commentators predicted, the GAC is better in some areas and
the SPLA in others, the GAC, for all its defects in craftsmanship, is the
superior text from a consumer's perspective.
At the macro level, how important are these consumer setbacks in
the governing statutory text? If the paternalistic Spanish welfare system
continues to provide a safety net at the level it long has, most cases of
product injury will probably go on never becoming "products liability cases"
in the first place.23 Those that, even despite this safety net, might otherwise
proceed to litigation, will mostly continue to be deterred by the persistent
structural features of the Spanish legal system identified by Professor
Casals.2" Presumably, it will still be only the most extreme situations that
241. In 1991, the European Commission proposed a directive which would have imposed
Community-wide standards for the liability of service providers. 1991 O.J. (C 12) 8. This proposal
was subsequently withdrawn. GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 1132 (1993), 225 (Supp. 1995).
242. Such an outcome was prospectively criticized by Rojo, more for its inelegance than
anything else. Rojo, supra note 4, at 1278.
243. See supra text accompanying note 24.
244. See supra text accompanying note 24.
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come before the Spanish civil courts. On the other hand, if the safety net is
removed or its benefits significantly altered, which does not seem
impossible,' the lowering of protection represented by the SPLA may
acquire somewhat greater practical significance in a universe in which more
Spanish product victims become forced to seek effective compensation for
their injuries through the civil law.
C. Spanish and United States Products Liability: Some Comparisons
Perhaps one reason for the Directive's rejection of the term "strict
liability" is its unsavory association with the products liability regime of the
United States, the experiences of European manufacturers with which had
frequently been met with "incredulous astonishment" or "ascribed to the
realm of fable."m But now, in fact, the observation might be made that,
with the implementation of the Products Liability Directive, the products
liability laws of the member states have been brought into closer alignment
with the law generally prevailing in the United States, in which strict
products liability has been a key feature since the early 1960s. 7 7 Spain, of
course, has had a strong variant of strict products liability, in some aspects
no doubt stronger than that in the United States, on the statute books since
1984. Although the SPLA weakens Spain's earlier form of strict liability,
the new act is still an embodiment of that theory, and thus Spain's law in this
area may still be said to be close to that in the United States, certainly closer
than it would be if its only products liability laws were those of its Civil
Code.
Such an observation, however, would obviously be open to the
charge of formalism, a comparison of two varieties of "law in books," when
what is really much more at issue is a comparison of "laws in action."
Comparison of laws should never be limited to juxtaposing
legal norms or institutions viewed in isolation. Rather, it
must display whatever rules are to be compared in their
social context. Only the depiction of the socio-cultural
background of a legal norm enables us to get an insight
245. See supra text accompanying note 100.
246. Peter Borer, Bringt uns die EG-Richtlinie "amerikanische Verhidtnisse"?, in US AND
EEC PRODUCT LIABILITY: ISSUES AND TRENDS 105, 124-25 (Roger Zach ed., 1988) [hereinafter
ZACH COLLECTION]. Borer, writing about Germany, notes that, when the Directive project first
began to be discussed, there was a fear that the United States doctrine of strict liability would
necessarily entail the American experience with that liability. Id. at 125.
247. Id. at 124.
[Vol. 2:371
Ansaldi
into a country's or a culture's multilayered process of
making and applying laws.2
As discussed above, one Spanish scholar has identified the unchanged
features of the Spanish legal landscape that he believes will prevent Spain's
experience with strict liability from ever comparing to that in the United
States.2' 9 Similarly, a German writer identifies the following features of the
United States legal and social system as primarily responsible for the
peculiarly American experience with the doctrine of strict products liability:
much lower levels of social insurance and welfare schemes; the attorney
system, particularly with respect to compensation by contingent fees;
extensive pre-trial discovery; jury trials; lack of rules for shifting attorneys'
fees; and punitive damages.2" He also notes the research done by another
German writer, predicting that the effect of introducing American-style strict
liability through the Directive would only be to increase risks, presumably of
manufacturers, by ten to twenty percent.2'
Hence, it may well be that Spanish products liability law may never
really be like American products liability law in any but the narrow sense of
"formal rules." That having been said, however, one might still venture a
number of comparisons between the two systems at that admittedly formal
level. These comparisons shall assume that § 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, "a veritable Everest among a few other relatively tall
peaks and hundreds of foothills,"2 2 is generally representative of United
States law in this area:
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to
User or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to
his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to
his property, if:
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such
a product, and
248. Id. at 125.
249. See supra text accompanying note 24.
250. ZA cH COLLECTION, supra note 246, at 129-46.
251. Id. at 146-47.
252. Marshall S. Shapo, In Search of the Law of Products Liability: The ALl Restatement
Project, 48 VAND. L. REV. 631, 636 (1995).
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(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or
consumer without substantial change in the
condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the
preparation and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product
from or entered into any contractual relation with
the seller. 3
To this statement of the rule itself must be added the accompanying caveat:
The [American Law] Institute expresses no opinion as to
whether the rules stated in this Section may not apply
(1) to harm to persons other than users or consumers;
(2) to the seller of a product expected to be processed or
otherwise substantially changed before it reaches the
user or consumer; or
(3) to the seller of a component part of a product to be
assembled.2- ,
Strict Liability: The first obvious point of comparison is the plain
exclusion of fault from the Restatement's inquiry, inasmuch as § 402A(2)(a)
makes the seller's due care no defense to liability. All the plaintiff need
show is a defective product in an unreasonably dangerous conditione, and the
physical harm, to the consumer/user or his property, thereby caused. This is
very much on a par with the SPLA's Article 5: "The injured person
attempting to obtain redress for the damages will need to prove the defect,
the damage and the causal relation between both."
Another feature of U.S. law, both as represented by the Second
Restatement as well as by the most recent draft of the Restatement (Third) of
Torts, is to omit any explicit consideration of product presentation and
marketing in the context of determining whether a product is defective, an
253. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1977). This provision was first approved
for inclusion in the Restatement in 1965. MICHAEL GREENFIELD, CONSUMER TRANSACTIONS 279
(2d ed., 1991).
254. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A caveat (1977).
255. It has been argued that "defective condition" and "unreasonably dangerous" are both
aspects of one and the same inquiry. See, e.g., James R. Adams, Product Liability Law in the
United States: An Overview, in PRODUCT LIABILITY: PREVENTION, PRACTICE AND PROCESS IN
EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 3, 5 (Rudolph Hulsenbek & Dennis Campbell eds., 1989).
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omission strongly criticized by Professor Shapo.- Article 3 of the SPLA,
by contrast, makes "presentation" the first of the attendant circumstances to
be considered in judging whether a product offers "the safety which might
legitimately be expected."
Scope of Protected Class: One striking feature is the former parallel
between the Restatement's grant of protection to the "user or consumer" and
its agnosticism about all others, on the one hand, and the narrowly defined
protected class under the GAC, consumers or users in the sense of "final
recipients," on the other. Comment o to the Restatement (Second) notes that
"there may be no essential reason why such [other] plaintiffs should not be
brought within the scope of the protection afforded," but states that the
limitation in the rule reflects the social pressure for a rule of strict liability
coming from consumers.2'
Liable Parties: Another point of comparison is the Restatement's
imposition of liability on all "sellers" of the defective product, whether or
not there is a contractual relationship between the seller and the
consumer/user. Such a formulation encompasses the entire chain of
distribution between the manufacturer and purchasing consumer/user, and
the liability of each to the consumer is not provisional or subsidiary; though,
naturally, one "link" in the chain may have recourse rights against another.
The great breadth of this formulation may reflect the large geographic size of
the United States, and the difficulties of obtaining long-arm jurisdiction or
bringing a lawsuit in a distant forum. The situation under Spanish law is
certainly comparable, but not precisely the same: manufacturers and
importers are the normally liable parties, with "suppliers" only occasionally
liable. While the United States law is more "pro-consumer" by providing
more potential defendants, doubtless it makes better general sense2 to try, as
the Spanish law does to some extent, to concentrate liability on the party, the
manufacturer, who was best able to avoid the injury, with the liabilities of
the importer and supplier being concessions to the practical difficulties
occasionally involved in holding a manufacturer liable.
While Section 402A is also agnostic on the liability of manufacturers
of component parts, it is nonetheless generally true that component
256. Shapo, supra note 252, at 664-65.
257. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. o (1977).
258. Cf. David W. Leebron, An Introduction to United States Products Liability Law:
Origins, Theory, Issues and Trends, in ZACH COLLECTION, supra note 258, at 36 (describing the
products liability of middlemen as "perhaps the least defensible application of the warranty heritage
of strict products liability").
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manufacturers, "after some initial hesitation," can now be held liable.19
Article 4. lb of the SPLA makes that liability explicit.
Development Risks: The text of the Restatement does not explicitly
speak to the important question of liability for development risks, and
comment k to § 402A speaks only to the conceptually related "unavoidably
unsafe products," which deal, however, with known risks that cannot be
eliminated. One leading American products liability scholar recently
opined that it is impossible to predict how an American court would respond
to a claimed "development risks" defense.2' Another writer described the
law here as "both murky and unsettled," though noting a trend in favor of
the state of the art defense.- ' This is to be contrasted with the clarity of
Spanish law on this issue: a "development risks defense" is permitted,
except as to pharmaceutical products, foodstuffs or food products intended
for human consumption.26 But if there is indeed a United States trend
towards a state of the art defense, there may in fact be occurring a
convergence of United States and Spanish law in this anti-consumer
direction.
Scope of Allowable Damages: It is also worth noting that United
States law, as represented by the Restatement, allows recovery for damage to
the consumer's "property," without any requirement that it be "consumer
property" in any narrow sense, and also allows recovery for such injuries
"from the ground up," i.e., without any deductions. The SPLA contains
both these "anti-consumer" features.
It should also be noted, though Section 402A does not speak to the
issue, that a United States plaintiff may also recover noncompensatory
punitive damages, a possibility that does not exist in Spain. 6 On the other
hand, however, an award of punitive damages in a United States proceeding
is frequently a means of providing covertly what the Spanish legal system
allows directly: recovery of the prevailing party's attorneys fees.
Services: One last issue, closely related if not directly on point, is
liability for defective services. By its only partial repealer of the GAC,M the
SPLA preserved a clear statutory basis for the imposition of strict liability for
defective services. No comparably broad statutory basis exists for imposing
259. Id.
260. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 402A cmt. k (1977).
261. Shapo, supra note 252, at 679.
262. Leebron, supra note 258, at 19, 23. For "state of the art" defense as the American label
for the "development risks" defense, see Bernstein, supra note 42.
263. See supra text preceding note 140 and accompanying note 141.
264. Casals, supra note 12.
265. See supra text accompanying notes 240-41.
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such liability on services in the United States; where liability for defective
services in fact exists, it is essentially a creature of case law or narrowly
targeted statutes, and in any event "the consumer recovers only upon proof
of negligence" .66
What Spanish commentators said when comparing the GAC with the
Directive could be applied, with greater justification still, to this comparison
of the formal rules of United States and Spanish products liability law: one
is better protective of consumer interests in some areas, the other in others.
But when these two bodies of rules are put into their institutional and social
setting, then which of the two systems, taken as a functioning whole, better
provides for the well-being of its consumers, let alone of the other competing
interests at stake, is very much a separate question.
266. GREENFIELD, supra note 253, at 342-58.
4251996]
426 ILSA Journal of Int'l & Comparative Law
APPENDIX267
JUAN CARLOS I
KING OF SPAIN
LAW 22/1994 of July 6, on civil liability for damages caused by defective
products.
To all those who shall see and have knowledge hereof, KNOW YE:
that the Cortes Generales have approved and that I grant my assent to the
following law:
STATEMENT OF REASONS [PREAMBLE]
This law has as its object the adaptation of Spanish law to European
Community Directive 85/374/EEC of July 25, 1985, concerning civil
liability for damages caused by defective products. The fruit of a long and
complex drafting process [proceso de elaboraci6n], the Directive aims to
achieve a substantially homogeneous legal regime within Community
boundaries on a subject especially delicate by reason of the conflicting
interests [involved].
Given that neither the scope of the protected class [6.mbito subjetivo
de tutela] nor the objective contemplated by the Directive coincide with
those of General Law 26/1984 of July 19 for the Defense of Consumers and
Users, it was opted to draft a special Bill.
Pursuant to the Directive, this law establishes a regime of strict
[objectiva] though not absolute liability, allowing the manufacturer to
absolve itself of liability under the circumstances enumerated.
Contemplated as compensable damages are personal injuries and
property damage with, in the latter case, a threshold amount of 65,000
pesetas.
The persons protected are, in general, those injured by the defective
product, independent of whether or not they hold the status of consumer in
the strict sense.
267. This translation is by the Author. See also Product Liability in Spain-The Recent
Legislation, LLOYDS PRODUCT LIABILITY INT'L, Dec. 31, 1994, available in LEXIS, World
Library, TXTLNE File (translating the same legislation into English).
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The manufacturer's objective liability lasts ten years from the time of
placing in circulation of the defective product causing the damage. It is a
reasonable period of time if one takes into account the bill's objective range
of application, which is confined to movable goods and gas and electricity.
Finally, the law makes use of the option offered by the Directive of
limiting a manufacturer's overall liability for personal injuries caused by
identical articles having the same defect.
ARTICLE 1. GENERAL [STATEMENT OF] PRINCIPLE
Manufacturers and importers shall be liable, in conformity with the
provisions of this law, for damages caused by defects in the products which
they respectively manufacture or import.
ARTICLE 2. STATUTORY DEFINITION OF PRODUCT
1. For purposes of this law, "product" means any movable good,
even when it is affixed to or incorporated into another movable good or real
property, except for primary agricultural and livestock materials, and
products of hunting and fishing which have not undergone an initial
transformation.
2. Gas and electricity are considered products.
ARTICLE 3. STATUTORY DEFINITION OF DEFECTIVE PRODUCT
1. By "defective product" it is meant that one does not offer the
safety which might legitimately be expected, keeping in mind all the
circumstances and, in particular, its presentation, the foreseeable reasonable
use of same and the time of its placing in circulation.
2. In any event, a product is defective if it does not offer the safety
normally offered by other examples in the same [product] series.
3. A product is not to be considered defective by the mere fact that
said product is subsequently placed in circulation in an improved form [de
forma mrus perfeccionada].
ARTICLE 4. STATUTORY DEFINITION OF MANUFACTURER AND
IMPORTER
1. For purposes of this law, "manufacturer" means:
a) the [manufacturer] of a finished product.
b) the [manufacturer] of any component part integrated into a
finished product.
c) one who produces a raw material.
d) anyone who holds himself out to the public as a
manufacturer, placing his name, company's name,
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trademark or any other sign or distinguishing feature on the
product or the packaging, wrapping or any other component
of the [product's] protection or presentation.
2. For these same purposes, "importer" means one who, in the
exercise of his entrepreneurial activity, introduces a product into the
European Union for sale, rent, lease, or any other form of distribution.
3. If the product's manufacturer cannot be identified, anyone who
provided or supplied the product shall be regarded as its manufacturer,
unless within a three-month period the person shall have indicated to the
person damaged or injured the identity of the manufacturer or of whomever
provided or supplied to the individual the said product. The same rule is to
be applied in cases of imported products if the product does not indicate the
name of the importer, even though the manufacturer's name is indicated.
ARTICLE 5. PROOF
The injured person attempting to obtain redress for the damages
caused will need to prove the defect, the damage, and the causal relation
between both.
ARTICLE 6. EXONERATING CAUSES
1. The manufacturer or importer shall not be liable if they show:
a) that they did not place the product in circulation.
b) that, on the circumstances of the case, it may be presumed
that the defect did not exist at the time the product was
placed in circulation.
c) that the product was not manufactured for sale or for any
other remunerative type of distribution [cualquier otra forma
de distribuci6n con finalidad econ6mica], nor manufactured,
imported, provided or supplied in the context of any
professional or entrepreneurial activity.
d) that the defect was due to the fact that the product was made
as mandated by existing rules [conforme a nonnas
imperativas existentes].
e) that the state of scientific and technical knowledge existing
at the time of [the product's] placing in circulation did not
allow the existence of the defect to be ascertained.
2. The manufacturer or importer of a component part of a finished
product shall not be liable if either shows that the defect is ascribable to the
design [concepci6n] of the product into which it was integrated, or to the
instructions given by that product's manufacturer.
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3. In the case of pharmaceutical products, foodstuffs or food
products intended for human consumption, the persons liable hereunder may
not invoke the exonerating clause contained in subparagraph e of paragraph
1 of this Article.
ARTICLE 7. JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY
The persons [made] liable for the same injury by the application of
this law shall be jointly and severally liable.
ARTICLE 8. INTERVENTION OF THIRD PARTIES
The manufacturer's or importer's liability shall not be reduced when
the injury was jointly caused by a product defect and the intervention of a
third party. Notwithstanding, the person liable hereunder who has satisfied
[the obligation to pay] compensation may claim of the third party the portion
corresponding to that person's intervention in causing the injury.
ARTICLE 9. INJURED PERSON'S FAULT
The manufacturer's or importer's liability may be reduced or
eliminated based on the circumstances of a case if the injury caused was
jointly due to a product defect and the fault of the injured person or [the
fault] of one for whom the latter is civilly liable.
ARTICLE 10. SCOPE OF PROTECTION
1. The regime of civil liability envisaged hereunder encompasses
cases of death and bodily injury, as well as damages caused to things distinct
from the defective product itself, provided that the item damaged is found to
have been objectively intended for private use or consumption and was
principally used in such manner by the injured person. In the latter event, a
threshold amount of 65,000 pesetas shall be deducted.
2. Other damages and injuries, including pain and suffering, shall
be compensable in conformity with the general civil law.
3. The present law shall not apply to recovery of damages caused
by nuclear accidents, provided such damages are covered by international
conventions ratified by European Union Member States.
ARTICLE 11. LIMITS ON TOTAL LIABILITY
For the liability regime envisaged hereunder, the manufacturer's or
importer's overall civil liability for death and personal injuries caused by
identical products showing the same defect will be limited to the amount of
10,500,000,000 pesetas.
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ARTICLE 12. LIMITATION PERIOD FOR ACTIONS
1. An action seeking redress of damages and injuries described
herein must be brought three years from the date the injured person suffered
the injury, from either the product defect or the damage that said defect
occasioned the individual, provided the party liable for such injury is known.
An action by one who has satisfied [the obligation to pay] compensation
against all others liable for the injury must be brought one year from the date
the compensation is paid.
2. The tolling of the limitation period is governed by provisions of
the Civil Code.
ARTICLE 13. EXTINGUISHMENT OF LIABILITY
The injured person's rights recognized herein shall be extinguished
upon the lapse of ten years from the date the specific product causing the
injury was placed into circulation, if the corresponding judicial claim has not
been commenced during that period.
ARTICLE 14. EXCULPATORY CLAUSES, OR CLAUSES LIMITING
LIABILITY, INOPERATIVE
As against the injured person, exculpatory clauses or clauses limiting
civil liability hereunder are inoperative.
ARTICLE 15. CONTRACTUAL OR NONCONTRACTUAL LIABILITY
The actions recognized hereunder have no effect on other rights the
injured person may have as a result of the contractual or noncontractual
liability of the manufacturer, importer, or of any other person.
ADDITIONAL PROVISION (ONE ONLY). SUPPLIER'S LIABILITY
The supplier of the defective product will be liable as though the
individual were the manufacturer or importer if the individual supplied the
product knowing of the existence of the defect. In that event, the supplier
may bring an action claiming over against the manufacturer or importer.
TRANSITIONAL PROVISION (ONE ONLY). PRODUCTS IN CIRCULATION
This law shall not apply to the civil liability arising from injuries
caused by products placed in circulation before its entry into effect. Said
liability shall be governed by provisions in effect at said time.
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FIRST FINAL PROVISION. CERTAIN PROVISIONS REPEALED
Articles 25 through 28 of General Law 26/1984 of July 19 for the
Defense of Consumers and Users shall be inapplicable to civil liability for
damages caused by defective products within the meaning of Article 2
hereof.
SECOND FINAL PROVISION. NEW TEXT OF ARTICLE 30 OF LAW
26/1984 OF JULY 19
Article 30 of General Law 26/1984 of July 19 for the Defense of
Consumers and Users is amended to read as follows:
The Government, after having heard from, interested
parties and consumer and user groups, shall have the
power to set up a mandatory insurance system for civil
liability deriving from damages caused by defective
products or services, and a guarantee fund covering, in
whole or in part, damages consisting of death, poisoning
or bodily injury.
THIRD FINAL PROVISION. MODIFICATION OF AMOUNTS
The Government is authorized to modify the amounts established
hereunder, in conformity with the periodic.revisions made by the Council of
the European Union, under the terms established by community norms.
FOURTH FINAL PROVISION. EFFECTIVE DATE
This law shall go into effect the day after its publication in the
"Official State Bulletin."
Wherefore,
I command all Spaniards, private citizens and [the public] authorities to
observe and make observed this law.
Madrid, July 6, 1994
JUAN CARLOS R.
The President of the Government
FELIPE GONZALEZ MARQUEZ
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